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I. INTRODUCTION
A litany of mass tort litigation has dominated the civil litigation
landscape for several decades.2 From asbestos, Agent Orange and
2. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility:
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breast implants to Bendectin, the Dalkon Shield and tobacco, to
name only a few, state and federal courts have had to cope with the
myriad problems these complex cases have raised. Putting aside the
critical question of when litigation over a particular product, drug or
substance becomes a mass tort,3 courts lack consistent guidance as to
how to resolve such cases efficiently once hundreds or thousands of
them are initiated.4
Now is a time of great uncertainty, complexity, and ferment in
the area of mass torts. Mass tort litigation involves injuries, real and
imagined, current and future, serious and minor, to hundreds of thou-
sands, if not millions, of people. The courts have had decidedly mixed
results in handling mass tort litigation.5 When such litigation presents
itself, how to pay all claimants fairly and efficiently becomes the ob-
vious question and key practical consideration. This practical consid-
eration, in turn, raises the leading question of many academics:
When, if ever, is an aggregated resolution of mass tort claims proper,
given the restraint on individual autonomy, and possible restraint on
due process rights, that such a resolution may entail?6 During the
The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845, 845-46 (1987); Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REv. 4, 8 (1983); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Under-
standing Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 961, 961-62 (1993) [hereinafter Hensler & Peterson]; Jack B. Weinstein,
Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 827, 829-30 (1993).
3. See Shiela Birnbaum, Class Certification-The Exception, Not the Rule, 41
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 347, 348-49 (1997) (noting the problem of premature mass
tort class action filings; for example, in the Felbatol litigation, a class action was
filed before any individual lawsuits were); Hensler & Peterson, supra note 2, at
1019-30; Georgene M. Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure: Will the New Proce-
dural Regime Help Resolve Mass Torts?, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1065, 1079-87 (1993)
[hereinafter Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure].
4. This is not to say that there are no sources of information. For example,
the Manual for Complex Litigation, Third Edition provides a plethora of infor-
mation on a wide variety of complex litigation management issues, such as dis-
covery. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1995). What is less
clear is the extent to which courts may use aggregation techniques, such as class
actions, to assist them in achieving a relatively quick, fair, and efficient resolution
of a class action. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They?
Tort Reform Via Rule 23,80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995); William W Schwarzer,
Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
837 (1995).
5. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 2, at 962-63; Vairo, Reinventing Civil
Procedure, supra note 3, at 1067.
6. See Abraham, supra note 2, at 846-47; Judith Resnik, Procedural Innova-
tions, Sloshing Over. A Comment on Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a
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early days of mass tort litigation, courts largely sided with the argua-
bly predominant academic view that mass tort claims should be de-
cided individually.7 Then, perhaps propelled by the need to deal with
the mammoth asbestos litigation, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation8 ("MDL Panel") began to appreciate the utility of trans-
ferring mass tort cases for pretrial purposes,9 and federal district
courts began to certify some mass tort classes.'0 After courts of ap-
peals affirmed some of these classes,"1 both federal district courts and,
increasingly, state courts were emboldened to certify classes that
were unthinkable only a few years before. 2 However, most of these
Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal
Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1627-28 (1995); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattain-
able Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power,
60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1683, 1791-1800 (1992); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Tri-
als in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 74-76; Stephen C.
Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 43-44.
But see Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 104; David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts:
Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561,581-82 (1986-87).
7. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984)
(vacating class certification in Bendectin litigation); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In
re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.), 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982) (vacating class certification in Dalkon Shield litigation); Ikonen v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (denying class certification in
flea and tick spray litigation); Mertens v. Abbott Lab., 99 F.R.D. 38 (D.N.H.
1983) (denying Rule 23(b)(3) class certification in DES litigation); Yandle v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (denying class certification in
asbestos litigation).
8. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation was established pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1407, which empowers the MDL Panel to transfer related federal
cases to a single federal district court for pretrial purposes. See MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 31.13 (3d ed. 1995).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter
Robins 11] (affirming Rule 23(b)(1) class certification in Dalkon Shield litiga-
tion); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987)
(affirming Rule 23(b)(1) class certification in Agent Orange litigation); In re
School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming asbestos property
damage Rule 23(b)(3) class); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th
Cir. 1986) (affirming Texas class in asbestos personal injury litigation).
11. See cases cited supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996)
(reversing district court order certifying nationwide cigarette litigation class ac-
tion); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing dis-
trict court order certifying asbestos settlement class action); In re American Med.
Sys., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (vacating the district court's order certifying
penile prostheses class action); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293
(7th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court order certifying class action in hemophil-
iac/HIV contamination litigation), cert. denied sub nom. 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995); 5
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACtiCE 23.01-23.87
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later classes did not make it through the appeals process,13 including
the massive Georgine asbestos future claim settlement class rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in June of 1997.4 As we will
see, the rhetoric employed by the courts over the past twenty-five
years largely explains the shifting results in these cases.
Amid this sea of uncertainty, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
is nearing the end of its mission. The Trust was set up to provide an
aggregated solution to the hundreds of thousands of Dalkon Shield
claims filed against the A.H. Robins Company." As perhaps the first
truly successful mass tort claims resolution facility to complete its
mission," it is a fortuitous time to look at how the Trust has per-
formed. This Article updates my 1992 article on the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust'7 and discusses the Trust's performance in light of
the apparent anti-aggregation bias implicit in the Supreme Court's
June 1997 opinion in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,18 the asbes-
tos litigation, the case known as Georgine in the lower courts, as well
as the courts of appeals' opinions handed down in the year or so be-
fore the Supreme Court's recent decision. 9
In Amchem, the Supreme Court seemed to question whether ag-
gregated solutions can be fair to all claimants.20 At the same time,
however, the Court cited extensively to the Advisory Committee's
note accompanying the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 which recog-
nized that "theoretic" individual autonomy concerns did not always
outweigh the practical interest in achieving a more sensible litigation
unit.2' The Trust's performance, I will argue, demonstrates that ag-
gregated solutions present the best hope for solving the practical
problems presented by mass torts by insuring fairness to claimants as
(Matthew Bender 3d ed. 1997).
13. See supra note 12.
14. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
15. See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm
Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) [hereinafter Vairo, Para-
digm Lost].
16. See e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION 280-81 n.88 (1995) ("Some trust mechanisms have functioned very
well. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust has been, on the whole, a success.");
Richard B. Schmitt, Tobacco-Suit Pacts May Become Tougher, WALL ST. J., Apr.
23, 1997, at B9 (The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust was "set up to distribute
funds to injured women that even some plaintiffs' lawyers say is a model of effi-
cient operation.").
17. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15.
18. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
19. See cases cited supra note 12.
20. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2231-52.
21. See id. at 2246.
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a group, as well as by minimizing transaction costs. Equally impor-
tant, when properly constructed and managed, aggregation can pro-
tect, and indeed promote the values underlying the due process rights
of individuals.'
Part II of this Article presents a brief history of the use of class
actions by federal courts in mass tort litigation to illustrate how the
rhetoric of class actions has evolved over the last few decades. It
concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court's recent asbestos
opinion. Part III describes the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust and
summarizes its genesis. This third part discusses the important poli-
cies of the Trust which are relevant to an aggregated resolution of
mass tort claims and evaluates the Trust's performance. Unfortu-
nately, a valid empirical examination of the claimants' satisfaction
must await the actual termination of the Trust. Nonetheless, anecdo-
tal evidence reveals a relatively high level of satisfaction. This dis-
cussion will show that the bias against aggregated resolutions of mass
torts is unjustified.
Part IV looks at the proposed tobacco settlement in summary
form and argues that whether it is Congress or the courts which ulti-
mately bless the settlement, the settlement is seriously defective in its
failure to provide for in adequate claims resolution system. The to-
bacco companies may be buying peace in terms of the absolute
amount of money they will be required to pay. As most observers
fear, however, the individualized nature of smokers' recoveries may
perhaps result in due process in form but certainly not in substance.
This Article concludes by arguing that mechanisms exist to satisfy the
Supreme Court's concerns about the fairness of mass tort settle-
ments.
II. WHAT THE COURTS HAVE WROUGHT
I have made my bias clear in past writings but will repeat it here.
My experience as chairperson of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
suggests that aggregated solutions to mass tort cases are the preferred
alternative to traditional one-on-one litigation.2 The Trust was set
up pursuant to a reorganization plan under the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code and not as a class action.A Nonetheless, in most
22. For a more extensive discussion of the history of the Dalkon Shield liti-
gation and the operation of the Trust, see Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15.
23. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 618, 654-58; Vairo, Reinvent-
ing Civil Procedure, supra note 3, at 1093-94.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
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important respects, the use of a class action and a Chapter 11 reor-
ganization plan may be functional equivalents because they both
have the potential to provide for the resolution of all, or most, claims
of a particular type.2s Notably, attempts at class certification as a ve-
hicle for obtaining a global resolution of tort claims almost invariably
precede a Chapter 11 filing.28 Indeed, had courts certified classes in
some of those cases, there may have been no need for the defendants
to seek Chapter 11 protection, at least as a procedural matter.' The
irony here is that scholarly and judicial concerns regarding the loss of
individual autonomy in the class action context cannot be raised in
the bankruptcy context. A damages class action pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3), through its opt-out rights, compels a higher degree of indi-
vidual autonomy than is required by the bankruptcy laws.
Congress by statute and the Supreme Court by way of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure have provided the federal judicial sys-
tem with an arsenal of potentially powerful aggregation tools to assist
the courts in resolving complex cases involving the same or similar
issues. Key among these tools are: 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the Multidistrict
Litigation statute, which allows the Multidistrict Litigation Panel to
transfer related cases to one district court for pretrial purposes;'
25. In other words, a claims resolution facility could be provided for as a re-
sult of class certification under Rule 23, as in the Agent Orange case, see infra
Part II.B.L.b., or as a part of a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, as in the
Dalkon Shield litigation, see infra Part III.A.
26. For example, in the Dalkon Shield litigation, before A.H. Robins filed its
Chapter 11 petition, the Ninth Circuit refused to certify a class. See infra notes
49-50 and accompanying text. Similarly, in the silicone breast implant litigation,
the unraveling of a class action settlement led Dow Coming to file a Chapter 11
petition. See Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Provid-
ers of Connecticut (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996) cert.
denied 117 S. Ct. 718 (1997).
27. Only after the court ultimately denied class certification and the number
of cases continued to grow in the Dalkon Shield litigation did A.H. Robins seek
Chapter 11 protection. In the silicone breast implant litigation, the court condi-
tionally certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class to provide a vehicle for settling all or most
breast implant claims. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d at 485. The settle-
ment provided for relatively large payments for the various injuries alleged. See
id. However, the number of claimants-about 440,000-who indicated their de-
sire to participate in the settlement process far exceeded the fund of approxi-
mately $4.25 billion that the several manufacturers of silicone breast implants
had offered to pay. See id. at 485-86. In addition, several thousand other claim-
ants opted out of the settlement. See id. at 485. Thus, when Dow Coming real-
ized that it was not buying the peace it had hoped for, it sought Chapter 11 pro-
tection. See id.- at 486. As a result of Dow Coming's filing, the court stayed all
actions against it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). See id.
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which permits representative
class action litigation in appropriate cases;29 and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42, which provides for the consolidation of related cases
within a district court.3 In the bankruptcy context, 28 U.S.C. § 1334,
which vests the federal district courts with subject matter jurisdiction
over cases "related to" a bankruptcy case, may be used to support
removal of state cases and, ultimately, their aggregated treatment in a
federal court.31 In addition to these aggregation rules, courts may in-
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994). Section 1334 provides for original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code), and
further provides in relevant part: "the district courts shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings... arising in or related to cases un-
der title 11." Section 1334 "related to jurisdiction" has been used in a number of
mass tort cases to effect consolidation. Perhaps the broadest use of such juris-
diction occurred in the silicone breast implant litigation. There, after Dow
Corning sought Chapter 11 protection, other manufacturers and suppliers of sili-
cone breast implants as well as Dow Corning's corporate parents, Dow Chemical
Co. and Coming Inc., who were co-defendants in the lawsuits against Dow
Coming, sought to have the state cases filed against them removed to federal
court and consolidated with the Dow Coming Chapter 11 proceeding pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (providing federal jurisdiction) and 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5)
(allowing consolidation). See In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d at 486-87. The
district court rejected the attempt but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded.
See id. at 485. Citing the "primary goal" of establishing "a mechanism for resolv-
ing the claims at issue in the most fair and equitable manner possible," the Sixth
Circuit adopted an expansive definition of "related to" jurisdiction. See id. at
487, 489. The court found that the tort claims against the non-debtors were suf-
ficiently related to the tort claims against Dow Coming, which were stayed pur-
suant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), because the former could give rise to contribution
or indemnification claims among the non-debtors which could have an impact on
the debtor's estate. See id. at 493-94. Thus, according to the court, the "'unusual
circumstances"' necessary to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1334 "related to" jurisdiction
were present. Id. at 493 (quoting A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999
(4th Cir. 1986)). The court also found that 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) granted the dis-
trict court handling the Dow Coming bankruptcy the power to transfer all the
cases to itself. See id. at 496. The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the decision of
the Fourth Circuit in the Dalkon Shield litigation. See id. The Fourth Circuit
had held that there was "related to" jurisdiction over claims against doctors and
A.H. Robins's insurance company. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994
(4th Cir. 1986).
Upon remand, the district court, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), held
that the actions against the non-debtors were subject to mandatory abstention.
See In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-CV-72397-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16754, at "20-21 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 1996). Section 1334(c)(2) provides for
mandatory abstention "if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated,
in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1994). The
Sixth Circuit granted mandamus in favor of the non-debtors, holding that an in-
dividualized determination must be made in each case to determine the impact of
[Vol. 31:79
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voke the court-made preclusion doctrine to bar relitigation of the
same issues32 and issue injunctions against state court litigation which
raise the same claims as those in federal court.33
A brief summary of the use of two of the most important aggre-
gation techniques, the Multidistrict Litigation statute and Rule 23, in
the context of some of the most notorious mass tort cases shows an
ambivalence at best, especially at the appellate level, toward the use
of these techniques in mass tort cases 4 While the timelines may not
be neat, one can observe through the rhetoric used in these cases the
ebb and flow of judicial attitudes towards mass tort class actions.
A. The Early Cases
Without the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, class actions in mass
tort cases would have been unthinkable.35 The key 1966 amendment
the case on the debtor's estate. See Lindsey v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Dow
Coming Corp.), 113 F.3d 565,569,572 (6th Cir. 1997). In addition, the Sixth Cir-
cuit found that discretionary abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) was also
"wholly inappropriate" given the court's prior acknowledgment of the
"significant impact that our resolution of these issues will have on the future
course of [bankruptcy] litigation." Id. at 571. Thus, the filing of bankruptcy, to-
gether with the broad reach of the "related to" jurisdictional provision and the
transfer power, provides a very potent tool for aggregation and global resolution.
32. See Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure, supra note 3, at 1073 & n.40.
33. See Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
Supplemental Jurisdiction; Removal; Preemption, Abstention and Diversity, at 48-
59, reprinted in NEW DIRECrIoNS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACrICE AND PRO-
CEDURE, Q247 ALI-ABA 47-58 (1996).
34. This group of author-selected class action cases can be criticized for ignor-
ing the hundreds of other decisions granting or denying class actions in other
mass torts or product liability actions which, if reviewed and analyzed, may paint
a different picture of the history of the use of mass tort class actions. However,
because these are among the most notorious and publicly known mass torts, they
provide a better sense of the rhetoric underlying judicial philosophy at different
points of time than the more routine cases.
35. Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the class action rule had an
equity orientation and thus was not conceived as being available in a common
law tort case. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1937 adoption;
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment. However,
practice with the rule showed that the rule was fraught with difficulties. As the
1966 Advisory Committee's note explains:
The categories of class actions in the original rule were defined in terms
of the abstract nature of the rights involved: the so-called "true" cate-
gory was defined as involving 'joint, common, or secondary rights"; the
'hybrid" category, as involving "several" rights related to "specificproperty"; the "spurious" category, as involving "several" rights attected
by a common question and related to common relief. It was thoughtthat the defi itions accurately described the situations amenable to t e
class-suit device, and also would indicate the proper extent of the judg-
ment in each category, which would in turn help to 
determine the res
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for our purposes is the provision for compensatory damage classes
under Rule 23(b)(3). The Advisory Committee's note to the 1966
amendments makes clear that one purpose of the revision was to
permit the use of damages class actions where the interests of indi-
viduals in prosecuting their actions "may be theoretic rather than
practical."36 Although the Advisory Committee had in mind cases
where an individual's economic stake was so small that one-on-one
litigation would be impracticable,' the idea that it might be appropri-
ate to use class actions to resolve damages cases was legitimized.
Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee's note makes clear that it
did not envision the routine use of class actions in mass tort litigation.
Even though the concept of mass tort litigation was relatively un-
known at the time, the problem of a mass accident, such as a plane
crash, was well-known." The Advisory Committee's note to the 1966
amendments made clear that even such mass accident cases
"ordinarily" would not be "appropriate" for class action treatment.
The Advisory Committee's note became the mantra of the courts in
the late 1970s and early 1980s as they denied class action treatment in
udicata effect, of he jud ment if questioned in a later action. Thus the
judgments in true" and 'hybrid" class actions would extend to the class(although in somewhat different ways); the judgment in a "spurious"
class action would extend only to the parties including intervenors. Inpractice the terms "joint," "common," etc., which were used as the basisof the Rule 23 classification proved obscure and uncertain. The courtshad considerable difficulty with these terms.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment (citations omit-
ted).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment; see also
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 391 (1967)
(the interest in controlling a litigation "may be no more than theoretic where the
individual stake is so small as to make a separate action impracticable.").
37. See FED. R. Ci. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amend-
ment. The Supreme Court quoted extensively from this note in the asbestos liti-gation class action case. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231,
2246-47 (1997).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amend-
ment; Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Ac-tions, 9 BUFF. L. RIV. 433,469 (1960).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.The Advisory Committee's note to the 1966 revision of Rule 23(b)(3) states:
A "'mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarynot appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that sigmi-
cant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to li-ability, would be present, affecting the individuals m different ways. Inthese circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class actionwould degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
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a variety of mass tort cases. Typically, these courts simply relied on
the Advisory Committee's note rather than engaging in a detailed
analysis of whether the requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied. The
Dalkon Shield litigation provides a good example.
In the late 1960s, due to alarm about the side effects of the birth
control pill, the intrauterine device ("IUD") became a popular alter-
native.4° In 1970 the A.H. Robins Company acquired the rights to the
Dalkon Shield IUD4' and began marketing it in January of 1971. By
the time the company withdrew the product from the United States
market, Robins had distributed approximately 2.8 million Dalkon
Shields in the United States and 1.7 million overseas.42 Approxi-
mately 3.6 million women worldwide actually used the Dalkon
Shield.43
Almost immediately upon distribution of the Dalkon Shield,
doctors began reporting various problems with the product, and
women started filing lawsuits in both state and federal courts, alleg-
ing a variety of injuries linked to the Dalkon Shield.44 The litigation
then unfolded in what became the typical mass tort scenario. Within
a couple of years, aided by publicity generated by the FDA's in-
volvement, the Dalkon Shield lawsuits developed into a mass tort.45
In 1975 the MDL Panel transferred the federal Dalkon Shield cases
to the district court of Kansas for pretrial proceedings under 28
40. See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 1 (1991).
41. A doctor and an engineer developed the Dalkon Shield and claimed that
it had a very high rate of preventing unwanted pregnancies. See id.; see also The
Company 16, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and
Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code
(Mar. 28, 1988) [hereinafter Company].
42. See Company, supra note 41, at 16.
43. See id.
44. Injuries included: unwanted pregnancies, ectopic pregnancies, septic
abortions, miscarriages, and birth defects allegedly caused to fetuses when con-
ception took place with the Dalkon Shield in the woman's uterus. There also
were complaints about excessive bleeding and cramping, Pelvic Inflammatory
Disease ("PID"), and complications arising from PID, including sterilization and
infertility. Many young women, who had not yet had children, were injured. For
obvious reasons, many of these cases had high emotional value. In some in-
stances, infections were so serious that Dalkon Shield users died. See SOBOL, su-
pra note 40, at 9.
45. As Professor Hensler has demonstrated, once the FDA becomes involved
in a potentially high volume litigation, and the press begins to report on the de-
bate about the safety of a product, what otherwise may have been high volume
but relatively routine litigation will become a mass tort. See Hensler & Peterson,
supra note 2, at 968-69, 1021-22 (discussing breast implant litigation, Dalkon
Shield litigation, and other mass torts).
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U.S.C. § 1407.4' By the end of 1979, with thousands of cases pending
nationwide, the courts remanded many of the MDL cases to their re-
spective transferee courts for trial.47
The district court in California tried to deal with the cases re-
manded to it with what at that time was a novel approach. After real-
izing that each Dalkon Shield case would take at least a week to try,
and realizing the potentially huge exposure-estimated by the court
to be well over A.H. Robins's net worth because of the claims for
punitive damages-the court certified a nationwide class under Rule
23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the issue of pu-
nitive damages. It also certified a California class under Rule
23(b)(3) on the issues of liability and compensatory damages.4 ' The
Ninth Circuit, however, reversed.49 The idea of individual autonomy
loomed large as the Ninth Circuit cited the 1966 Advisory Commit-
tee's note that mass tort cases ordinarily are not appropriate for class
action treatment.m This opinion assured that Dalkon Shield cases
would ordinarily be tried as individual lawsuits.
In another trait typical of mass tort litigation, Robins won jury
verdicts in many of the early cases."1 Thus, there did not seem to be
any immediate pressure on Robins to resolve the claims against it
globally. With the discovery of certain sensitive documents, however,
plaintiffs began to win huge compensatory and punitive awards. ' For
46. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 406 F. Supp. 540,541 (J.P.M.L. 1975).
47. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 625; see also In re A.H. Rob-
ins, 610 F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (J.P.M.L. 1985) (discussing pending Dalkon Shield
actions).
48. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 896 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
49. See id. at 856.
50. See id. at 852; supra note 39.
51. See SOBOL, supra note 40, at 15; Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure, su-
pra note 3, at 1073.
52. See, e.g., Official Dalkon Shield Claimants' Committee v. Mabey (In re
A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Robins 111]. To date,
the tobacco industry has not paid a dime in damages to an individual tort plain-
tiff. In two cases juries rendered verdicts for plaintiffs. However, in the first
case, Rose Cippilone's family eventually dropped the case after the $400,000
verdict was successfully appealed. See Cippilone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d
541 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing $400,000 verdict), aff'd in relevant part, rev'd in part,
505 U.S. 504 (1992). In July 1996 a Florida jury awarded a lung cancer victim
$750,000 in damages from Brown & Williamson. See Nancy Rivera Brooks, To-
bacco Firms Not Culpable for Death, Jury Rules, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1996, at
Dl. However that verdict will be appealed on preemption grounds. See Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 680 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
It was not until damaging documents began to appear, and former industry em-
ployees began to testify against the interests of the industry, that settlement lev-
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instance, on May 3, 1985, a jury in the Tetuan case in Kansas awarded
compensatory damages of $1.75 million and punitive damages of $7.5
million. 3
At this point, Robins and its insurer, Aetna, had disposed of
about 9,500 suits, and had paid out approximately $530 million. 4 Yet,
approximately 6,000 cases were still pending, with more filed every
day.5 The multidistrict litigation in the District of Kansas had been
pending for about ten years. Common discovery was largely com-
pleted and most of the individual actions had been remanded to their
respective transferor district courts. 6
Now seeking to achieve a global resolution of all claims against
it, Robins filed before the MDL Panel another motion seeking trans-
fer of more than 1,700 of the federal cases against it to the Eastern
District of Virginia.' The Panel denied Robins's motion largely be-
cause common discovery, the essential purpose of the MDL transfer,
was already complete.58 The Panel made clear that the MDL proce-
dure was not a universal settlement device:
Robins has been candid in stating to the Panel that it seeks
transfer of these actions under Section 1407 to the Eastern
District of Virginia (a district other than the original MDL-
211 transferee district, and also the district in which Robins
erage began to turn in favor of plaintiffs. Only after pressure was brought to
bear by the state attorney general Medicaid reimbursement lawsuits did the in-
dustry consider a global settlement. See discussion infra Part IV. The industry
has now settled two of these suits. See Florida Settles Lawsuit Against Tobacco
Industry, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 26, 1997, at 4; Henry Weinstein, Mississippi Settles
Its Tobacco Industry Suit, L.A. TIMEs, July 4, 1997, at Al. In addition, the flight
attendant class action suit has been settled. However, none of the $300 million
settlement will be awarded to the plaintiffs. Rather, it will be used to support re-
search. An additional $49 million will be paid to the class's lawyers. The agree-
ment also provides for the possible continuation of individual flight attendant
suits, but no class actions, and, in the individual suits, the cigarette companies
will bear the burden of proof on the issue of whether second hand smoke causes
the injuries alleged by the flight attendants. The attendants, nonetheless, will be
required to prove that their own injuries were caused by second hand smoke, and
will not be entitled to sue for punitive damages. See Neff A. Lewis, First Thing
We Do, Let's Pay All the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1997, at A8; Mireya
Navarro, Cigarette Makers Reach Settlement in Nonsmoker Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oc-
tober 11, 1997, at Al.
53. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1210 (Kan. 1987).
54. See Company, supra note 41, at 16.
55. See id.
56. See In re A.H. Robins Co., "Dalkon Shield" Ind. Prods. Liab. Litig. 610 F.
Supp. 1099, 1100 (J.P.M.L. 1985).
57. See id. at 1099-1100.
58. See id. at 1100.
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is headquartered) as part of an overall effort to secure a
universal resolution of all Dalkon Shield actions. Such a
goal is certainly not inimical to the principles underlying
Section 1407, but Section 1407 transfer can only be a tool in
such an effort if the statutory criteria for transfer under
Section 1407 have been satisfied. This simply has not been
done in regard to the Robins motion."
Three months after Tetuan, having failed in its last effort before
the MDL Panel to force a final resolution of the claims against it,
Robins filed for reorganization relief under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code0
Attempts to certify classes or to push the limits of the multidis-
trict litigation procedure fared no better in the early phase of asbes-
tos litigation. For example, in 1974 in Yandle v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
a district court in Texas refused to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class on the
issue of liability."' The court characterized the case as "a massive tort
action" because it involved all former employees and their successors
at the defendant's plant in Texas. 2 The plaintiffs conceded that class
treatment on the question of damages would be inappropriate be-
cause of the individual nature of each class member's claims. 6 None-
theless, the district court, largely relying on the Advisory Commit-
tee's note and the value of individual autonomy upon which it is
predicated, refused to certify a class limited to the issue of liability."
The court primarily invoked policy reasons,65 rather than the
substance of Rule 23,6 for its refusal to certify. The court did im-
prove upon the Advisory Committee's note somewhat by distinguish-
59. See id.
60. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. II 1995). Robins's bankruptcy
resulted from the "avalanche of actions filed in various state and federal courts
throughout the United States... seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained
by the use of an intrauterine contraceptive device known as a Dalkon Shield."
A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir. 1986).
61. Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
62. Id. at 567.
63. See id. at 568.
64. See id. at 572.
65. The court stated: "First of all there is the general feeling that when per-
sonal injuries are involved that each person should have the right to prosecute his
own claim and be represented by the lawyer of his choice. Secondly, that the use
of this procedure may encourage solicitation of business by attorneys." Id. at
569.
66. The court continued: "And finally that individual issues may predomi-
nate because the tortfeasor's defenses may depend on facts peculiar to each
plaintiff." Id.
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ing the case of mass torts from mass accidents. By the time of the
Yandle decision in 1974, use of class actions had become routine in
mass accident cases.67 But these cases were of no help in the mass
tort context:
This case is very different from the single mass accident
cases that have in the past allowed a class action to proceed
on the liability issues .... Usually, one set of operative facts
will establish liability. Here we have two lawsuits covering a
ten year span of time in which the nine defendants acted dif-
ferently at different times.'
The court refused to see the distinction between global and spe-
cific causation as a predominant issue: more specifically, whether
there was exposure to asbestos at all, and whether asbestos could
cause the complained of injuries. Rather, the court made the true but
rather irrelevant statement that it was "in agreement with the defen-
dant that there is not a single act of negligence or proximate cause
which would apply to each potential class member and each defen-
dant in this case."69 Moreover, the court found that the "superior
method for adjudication of this case is to continue allowing interven-
tion freely for those who wish to join and to maintain firm control
over this litigation by utilizing the tools set forth in the Manual for
Complex and Multidistrict Litigation."'7
Perhaps more surprising than the courts' reluctance to certify
mass tort class actions during this time period was the MDL Panel'sg
refusal to invoke the pretrial transfer provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in
the asbestos litigation.7
While no mechanisms authorize the formal consolidation of state
court cases filed in different states or coordination of related state
and federal litigation, Congress enacted a statutory scheme, 28
67. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.2 (3d ed. 1995). See gen-
erally Frances E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L.
REv. 659 (1989) (discussing a functional approach to managing complex litiga-
tion).
68. Yandle, 65 F.R.D. at 571.
69. Id
70. Id at 572.
71. See In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig.,
431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.L. 1977).
72. Although there is no legislation authorizing transfer, consolidation and
coordination of related state and federal litigation, there have been various pro-
posals for more effectively handling complex litigation pending in state and fed-
eral courts. For example, the American Law Institute has proposed a variety of
procedural solutions for dealing with such litigation, including the following: ex-
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U.S.C. § 1407, for consolidating and coordinating related cases filed
in different federal district courts.73
Product liability cases, one example of cases commonly cited as
appropriate for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407,74 and often the foun-
dation for mass tort litigation, actually have caused some difficulty
for the Panel. Although numerous product liability cases have been
transferred, the routine use of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 transfers in mass tort
cases is of relatively recent vintage.75 For example, in 1977 the MDL
Panel declined to transfer the pending asbestos cases because it was
not convinced that such cases raised sufficient common questions of
fact.76 At the time, 103 cases were pending in 19 different district
courts. The Panel denied transfer again in 1980, 1985, 1986, and
198727 By 1991 the number of asbestos cases in the federal courts
reached over 26,000. At that time, the MDL Panel, citing the
changed circumstances, decided that transfer of the asbestos cases
under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 was appropriate.
panded federal diversity subject matter jurisdiction to provide a federal forum
alternative in a broader range of cases; reverse removal to permit federal cases to
be handled in the state courts where appropriate; expanded powers for a new
Complex Litigation Panel which would take the place of the MDL Panel; federal-izing choice of law rules; and new rules pertaining to personal jurisdiction and
preclusion. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STAT-
cuTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994). These proposals raise diffi-
cult federalism issues and therefore adoption is unlikely. Nonetheless, in recent
years, federal district and state court judges have worked closely and coopera-
tively on a voluntary basis in a number of complex cases to achieve a high degree
of efficiency. See William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Co-
ordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. Rv. 1689 (1992).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
74. Many types of disputes, ranging from antitrust, securities, and product
liability cases to mass disaster and mass tort cases, result in the filing of related
cases in different district courts throughout the United States. When fashioning
§ 1407, the multidistrict litigation statute, Congress cited these and other types of
cases, such as patent and trademark suits, as the types "in which massive filings
of multidistrict litigation are reasonably certain to occur." H.R. REP. No. 90-
1130, at 3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900; see also S. REP. No.
90-454, at 7 (1967) (suggesting that product liability, as well as antitrust, securities
and mass accident cases, would be particularly susceptible to transfer).
75. Compare In re Ortho Pharm. "Lippes Loop" Prods. Liab. Litig., 447 F.
Supp. 1073 (J.P.M.L. 1978) (denying multidistrict litigation transfer) with In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L.
1992) (granting multidistrict litigation transfer).
76. See In re Asbestos, 431 F. Supp. at 910.
77. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 417
(J.P.M.L. 1991) (discussing history of asbestos litigation).
78. See id.
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B. High Tide for Mass Tort Aggregation
Invoking changed and unique circumstances became the hall-
mark of the next phase of mass tort aggregation decisions. Consid-
erations shifted away from concerns of individual autonomy to the
practicalities of handling and resolving through settlement hundreds
and thousands of pending cases.
Asbestos litigation is a dramatic example of the development of
mass tort aggregation. As discussed above, the MDL Panel rejected
five attempts to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Moreover, in late 1990, in
In re Allied Signal Inc.,79 the Sixth Circuit rejected the efforts of a
small group of federal judges who worked together to certify a na-
tionwide asbestos litigation class action. ° Yet, only about six months
later in early 1991, the MDL Panel transferred all 26,639 asbestos
cases pending nationwide to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."'
Five years later, the number of tag-along and other cases pending in
the Eastern District had more than doubled.'
The MDL Panel's 1991 opinion did not suggest that its previous
decisions not to transfer asbestos cases in 1977 and the 1980s were
wrong. Instead, the Panel noted that changed circumstances-the
thousands of pending cases-persuaded it "that th[e] litigation ha[d]
reached a magnitude, not contemplated in the record before [them]
in 1977, that threaten[ed] the administration of justice and that re-
quire[d] a new, streamlined approach. ' m
In a nod to the individual autonomy concerns of some litigants
who believed the transfer would "result in their actions entering
some black hole, never to be seen again,"' the Panel nonetheless
authorized the transfer of asbestos cases to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania; however, it then catalogued a number of devices that
the district court could use to protect individual interests.5
79. 915 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1990).
80. See id. at 191. Of course, the Sixth Circuit's decision was not surprising
because the group of judges, notwithstanding their good intentions, in effect con-
stituted themselves as an ad hoe court without any constitutional or congres-
sional authority for doing so.
81. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. at 416-17.
82. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6199, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("The size of MDL 875 has now grown from 26,639 to
58,478.").
83. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. at 418.
84. Id. at 423 n.10.
85. See icL at 420-23. Although the Panel stated that it did not have the
power to direct the transferee court in the exercise of its power and discretion, it
noted a number of issues to be considered by the transferee court in order to
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In 1977, the Panel took the orthodox approach consistent with
the anti-aggregation/pro-litigant autonomy approach taken by the
courts in deciding whether to certify product liability actions for class
action treatment under Rule 23(b)(3)." Until the mid-1980s the pre-
vailing view was that individual liability issues generally outweighed
any common issues that such litigation presented in order to protect
the "general assumption" that each product liability plaintiff has a
right to his or her own lawsuit and attorney of choice." Later, paral-
leling the greater willingness to transfer cases under 28 U.S.C. §
1407,' district courts began to show a willingness, often with approval
from the courts of appeals, to certify mass tort class actions of various
kinds.89
The most notorious of those cases involved asbestos, 9' Agent
Orange," the Dalkon Shield,92 breast implants," and tobacco.9 4 Of
streamline the litigation such as: a single national class action trial on a number
of discrete issues, such as product defect, the state of the art defense, or punitive
damages; a deferral program for plaintiffs who were not presently seriously ill,
such as a pleural registry; limited fund class action determinations; and, perhaps
most importantly, global settlement. See id. at 420-21. Although the transferee
court took heed, consistent with the emerging trend at the time, and approved a
class action settlement, the Third Circuit reversed the class certification. See
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996). The Supreme
Court agreed that the settlement class was inappropriate. See Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
86. See supra notes 35-70 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also Payton v. Abbott Labs,
83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (certifying Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiffs class in DES
litigation), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983) (vacating class certification in
light of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision to unequivocally
reject the theory of a classwide imposition of enterprise liability for those class
members who could not identify the source of the DES which allegedly affected
them, so that questions of law and fact common to the class no longer predomi-
nated over questions affecting only individual class members).
88. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 749-50
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Some 600 separate cases have been sent to this district from
all over the country with an estimated fifteen thousand named plaintiffs."); In re
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17332 (D.P.R.
1988) (275 actions); In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab.
Litig., 844 F. Supp. 1553 (J.P.M.L. 1994) (173 actions).
89. See infra notes 90-162 and accompanying text.
90. See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996) (certifying manda-
tory class in Texas asbestos litigation), cert granted and judgment vacated, 117 S.
Ct. 2503 (1997) (judgment vacated and case remanded to Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals for further consideration in light of Amchem Products., Inc. v. Windsor,
117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997)); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986);
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 468
(5th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court order certifying class in Texas asbestos
litigation).
91. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b.; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
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course not all attempts at certification were successful at the courts of
appeals.95 There is no question, however, that district courts were
willing to use class actions as vehicles for managing or settling mass
torts cases, and that in extraordinary cases courts of appeals would
affirm. For example, in 1986, "despite misgivings," the Third Circuit
affirmed a Rule 23(b)(3) class in the asbestos property damage case,
and commented that "the trend has been for courts to be more re-
ceptive to use of the class action in mass tort litigation.,
96
To illustrate the difference in rhetoric, I will review several cases
in which the court of appeals affirmed district court orders certifying
a class.
1. The real world of dispute resolution conquers the theoretics of
individual autonomy
The histories of asbestos litigation and the Agent Orange case
illustrate how the courts moved away from relatively ephemeral con-
cerns about individual autonomy to the practicality of trying to
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming district court order certifying
Rule 23(b)(3) class in Agent Orange litigation).
92. See infra Part III; see also Robins II, supra note 10, 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.
1989) (affirming mandatory class action against Dalkon Shield product liability
insurer in litigation related to A.H. Robins Chapter 11 proceeding).
93. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp.
1469 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (certifying class against breast implant manufacturers).
94. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995)
(certifying nationwide Rule 23(b)(3) class in tobacco litigation on addiction the-
ory), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d
888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, Phillip Morris Inc. v. Broin, 654 So.
2d 919 (Fla. 1995) (Table No. 84,547).
95. See, e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir.
1993) (reversing mandatory class certification in asbestos litigation insurance dis-
pute); In re Federal Skywalk Classes, 93 F.R.D. 415 (1982), rev'd, 680 F.2d 1175
(6th Cir. 1982) (reversing mandatory class certification in accident case). Perhaps
the result in these cases may be seen as demonstrating judicial reluctance to use
mandatory, limited fund, class action theories in mass tort cases, especially where
the federal court class certification would have the practical effect of enjoining
related state court proceedings. See In re Federal Skywalk Classes, 680 F.2d
1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1982). The district court certified the class in part to prevent
competing actions which might frustrate the federal court's attempts at settle-
ment. The Sixth Circuit reversed because the mandatory class had the effect of
an injunction and because the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, forbids the
federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings unless one of three narrow
exceptions, none of which the court found to be present in the litigation, were
satisfied. See id. at 1181-82. However, by the mid-1990s, courts of appeals also
would overturn class certifications in damages class actions under Rule 23(b)(3).
See infra Part II.C.2.
96. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1009 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted).
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provide recoveries on a more rational, fair, and less costly basis.
First, we will look at the Texas asbestos cases and then Agent Orange
to see how Judge Robert M. Parker and Judge Jack B. Weinstein,
federal district court judges who became well-known for their inno-
vation in the area of mass torts,' pushed the envelope away from
traditional thinking about mass torts and class actions and provided a
basis for facilitating an affirmance by the court of appeals.
a. the Texas asbestos cases
Experts have estimated that over 21 million American workers
have suffered exposure to significant amounts of asbestos at the
workplace since 1940, and that environmental contact or contact with
relatives who have worked with the products exposed millions of
others."
Through his federal district court appointment, Judge Parker
might have expected a varied caseload. Unfortunately for him he
was appointed to the Eastern District of Texas." Nearly 900 asbes-
tos-related personal injury cases, involving over 1000 plaintiffs, were
pending in Judge Parker's court.'O Some plaintiffs had been waiting
since 1979 for a trial, and new cases were being filed every day.' The
court predicted filings to continue at a steady rate into the millen-
nium.1l
Ten of these plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all plaintiffs
with asbestos-related personal injury actions pending in the Eastern
District of Texas on December 31, 1984.20 Judge Parker, "[flinding a
97. Professor Linda Mullenix has written extensively about Judge Parker,
who handled the asbestos cases. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolida-
tion: Post-Aggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 475, 482-95 (1991) (highlighting Judge Parker's career as a highly
progressive and innovative judge in mass torts litigation) [hereinafter Mullenix,
Beyond Consolidation]. Judge Jack B. Weinstein's role in mass tort litigation has
also been written about. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON
TRIAL (1986). Judge Weinstein has also written extensively about mass torts.
See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 16.
98. See Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Ad-
dressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FoRDHAM L. REV.
37, 37 n.1 (1983); Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate
Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the
Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1297, 1301 n.15 (1983).
99. See Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation, supra note 97, at 488-89.
100. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468,470 (5th Cir. 1986).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
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'limited fund' theory too speculative,... refused to certify the class
under Rule 23(b)(1)."1' 4 Based on his past experience, however, he
concluded that evidence concerning the "state of the art" defense, a
central issue in asbestos cases, would vary little as to individual
plaintiffs even though introduction of evidence on this issue would
consume a major part of the time required for their trials.l Judge
Parker, upon analysis of the elements of Rule 23, concluded that cer-
tification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class on this issue was proper."'6 By con-
ducting one class trial on the state of the art defense as well as other
defense-related issues such as product identification and defective-
ness, gross negligence and damages, both the litigants and the court
would save considerable time and resources.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.'7 Rather
than invoking the 1966 Advisory Committee's note as courts in the
earlier cases did, the Fifth Circuit began by cataloguing the concerns
raised in its earlier asbestos cases, including its "concern about the
mounting backlog of cases and inevitable, lengthy trial delays.""' It
then noted that courts generally refused to certify mass tort cases be-
cause differences between individual plaintiffs on issues of liability,
defenses of liability, and damages were thought to overshadow the
common issues.'O Summarizing the new approach to thinking about
mass torts, the Fifth Circuit stated:
The courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives
and priorities by the current volume of litigation and more
frequent mass disasters .... If Congress leaves us to our
own devices, we may be forced to abandon repetitive hear-
ings and arguments for each claimant's attorney to the ex-
tent enjoyed by the profession in the past. Be that as time
will tell, the decision at hand is driven in one direction by all
the circumstances. Judge Parker's plan is clearly superior to
the alternative of repeating, hundreds of times over, the liti-
gation of the state of the art issues with, as that experienced
judge says, "days of the same witnesses, exhibits and issues
from trial to trial."
104. See id.
105. See id. at 470-71.
106. See id. at 472-73.
107. See id. at 471-75.
108. Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
109. See Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 473 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory
committee's note to 1966 amendment).
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This assumes plaintiffs win on the critical issues of the
class trial. To the extent defendants win, the elimination of
issues and docket will mean a far greater saving of judicial
resources. Furthermore, attorneys' fees for all parties will
be greatly reduced under this plan, not only because of the
elimination of so much trial time but also because the fees
collected from all members of the plaintiff class will be con-
trolled by the judge. From our view it seems that the de-
fendants enjoy all of the advantages, and the plaintiffs incur
the disadvantages, of the class action-with one exception:
the cases are to be brought to trial. That counsel for plain-
tiffs would urge the class action under these circumstances is
significant support for the district judge's decision. Neces-
sity moves us to change and invent.1
It is important to note the themes highlighted by the court here:
(1) the centrality of a common issue; (2) the need to save judicial re-
sources; (3) the need to control transaction costs, thereby reducing
attorneys' fees by eliminating the need to retry these issues; and (4)
the need for courts to be innovative in the face of legislative inaction.
Notably absent in the court's analysis was the concern for preserving
individual autonomy which had motivated the earlier decisions.
b. Agent Orange
Similar efficiency considerations, as well as a central common is-
sue, motivated the decision to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class in the
Agent Orange litigation. Plaintiffs, Vietnam War veterans and mem-
bers of their families, claimed to have suffered damages as a result of
the veterans' exposure to herbicides produced by the defendants.'
Judge George Pratt, to whom the MDL Panel had assigned the Agent
Orange cases that were pending throughout the federal district
courts, decided that the case should proceed as a class action."' After
analyzing different methods for case management and the elements
of Rule 23, Judge Pratt concluded:
With respect to the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action, the court has carefully
and humbly considered the management problems pre-
sented by an action of this magnitude and complexity, and
110. Id. at 473.
111. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 768
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
112. See id. at 785, 798.
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concluded that great as they are, the difficulties likely to be
encountered by managing these actions as a class action are
significantly outweighed by the truly overwhelming prob-
lems that would attend any other management device cho-
sen. While the burdens on this court might be lessened by
denying class certification, those imposed collectively on the
transferor courts after remand of the multidistrict cases
would be increased many times."
Several years later, the case was before Judge Jack B. Weinstein.
Judge Weinstein noted that no class certification order was entered.
He referred to Judge Pratt's statement regarding the later stages of
the litigation, that proceeding as a class "may require reconsidera-
tion" of the certification. Judge Weinstein decided to enter an or-
der certifying the class for all issues under Rule 23(b)(3) and for the
issue of punitive damages under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
Judge Weinstein's analysis is important because, like the Texas
asbestos decisions just discussed, it did not reject certification out-
right by citing the 1966 Advisory Committee's note, which previously
led to a slavish interpretation of Rule 23 in mass tort class actions. 6
Rather, Judge Weinstein invoked policy arguments in favor of class
certification and aggregation as his guide in applying Rule 23.117 He
began by acknowledging the importance of the commonality re-
quirement but noted: "Nevertheless, it is not conclusive. In deciding
whether common questions predominate, a pragmatic evaluation of
the interest of the class members is given great weight." ' As in the
113. See icL at 791.
114. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 720 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 790).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 721-22.
117. See id. at 720-21.
118. Id. at 722. Judge Weinstein quotes:
As Professors Wright and Miller put it: "In general, a Rule 23(b)(3) ac-
tion is appropriate whenever the actual interests of the parties can be
served best by a single action .... [Tihe proper standard under Rule
23(b)(3) is a pragmatic one, which is in keeping with the basic objectives
of the Rule .3(b)(3) class action. Thus, when common questions repre-
sent a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all
members of the class in a single adjudication, there is a clear justification
for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual
basis."
Id. at 722 (alteration in original) (quoting 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1777, 1778
(1972)).
"Litigation economies are also relevant. One commentator has gone so
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asbestos context, Judge Weinstein looked to the practicality of get-
ting claims resolved rather than the theoretics" 9 of individual
autonomy.
Judge Weinstein distinguished the early cases involving DES, the
Dalkon Shield and asbestos which rejected class certification. In con-
trast to those cases where the courts found that individual issues
would predominate, Judge Weinstein concluded that in the Agent
Orange case, "the trial is likely to emphasize critical common de-
fenses applicable to the plaintiffs' class as a whole,"'' such as general
causation and the government contractors' defense. Moreover,
resolution of these issues "would do much to resolve the individual
claims of the class members. '2
Judge Weinstein articulated the primary and practical reason
why an aggregated approach to the resolution of mass tort cases is
preferable: the enhanced possibility of settlement without the need
for hundreds of trials, or even one massive trial. He stated:
Finally, the court may not ignore the real world of dispute
resolution. As already noted, a classwide finding of causa-
tion may serve to resolve the claims of individual members,
in a way that determinations in individual cases would not,
by enhancing the possibility of settlement among the parties
and with the federal government.Y2
Obviously, a classwide finding in favor of plaintiffs would greatly
enhance their bargaining power vis-A-vis the defendants. As a result
of their knowledge of the possible shift in the balance of bargaining
power, defendants would be more likely to offer a more attractive
settlement to avoid an even more dramatic shift in case a "bet your
company" strategy failed." As discussed in the next section, later
far as to suggest that 'the chief purpose of the predomination inquiry is not to
measure the compatibility of class action procedures with substantive law but to
determine whether a class action will in fact realize any litigation economies."'
Id. at 723 (quoting Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1318, 1505 (1976)).
119. As discussed below, the Court cited the Advisory Committee's note to
the 1966 amendment, which analyzed the practical purpose of a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action in appropriate cases in contrast to the "theoretic" interest individuals
may have in conducting separate lawsuits. See infra notes 125-30and accompany-
ing text.
120. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 723.
121. Id
122. Id.
123. See Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence: Tort System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers' Rates
of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1755, 1780-82 (1994).
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decisions vacating class action certifications object to this alteration
of the balance of bargaining power.24
Turning to the mandatory class on the issue of punitive damages,
Judge Weinstein noted that the rationale for using a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class in mass tort litigation is the "limited fund" theory.'2
In limited fund cases, individual cases should be "converted into a
class action so that the limited fund can be equitably distributed
among all members of that class.""'
The limited fund, which includes relevant insurance, could be
considered to be the assets of the defendants." Alternatively, par-
ticularly in the case of mass tort litigation, the fund could have a
more limited meaning, such as "where the first judgments may take
all of a limited punitive damage award. If earlier claimants proceed
on an individual basis, it is urged, they will deplete the defendants'
assets and leave nothing for later claimants."'1' In the context of the
Agent Orange litigation, he found that a limited fund class on the is-
sue of punitive damages should be certified.'29 Finding that there was
a substantial probability that limited punitive damages may
be allowed,.., it would be equitable to share this portion of
the possible award among all plaintiffs who ultimately re-
cover compensatory damages. Yet, if no class is certified
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), non-class members who opt out un-
der Rule 23(b)(3) would conceivably receive all of the puni-
tive damages or, if their cases are not completed first, none
at all.' °
Several years later, after Judge Weinstein approved a class ac-
tion settlement, the Second Circuit affirmed the aspect of the order
certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class. In affirming the order, the Second
124. See infra Part II.C.
125. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 725.
126. ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN OvERvIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACrIONS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 45 (2d ed. 1977) ("The paradigm Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
case is one in which there are multiple claimants to a limited fund... and there is
a risk that if litigants are allowed to proceed on an individual basis those who sue
first will deplete the fund and leave nothing for the late-comers.").
127. See 100 F.R.D. at 725.
128. Id. (citing Deborah Dietsch-Perez, Note, Mechanical and Constitutional
Problems in the Certification of Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions
under Rule 23, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 517 (1983); Note, Class Actions for Punitive
Damages, 81 MicH. L. REv. 1787 (1983); Note, Class Certification in Mass Acci-
dent Cases under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REv. 1143 (1982-83)).
129. 100 F.RID. at 727.
130. Id. at 728.
131. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166 (2d Cir.
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Circuit's language was far less bold than that used by Judge Wein-
stein. Nonetheless, it served to confirm that courts of appeals would
affirm classes when appropriate extraordinary circumstances were
present32 Indeed, the court began by noting that Agent Orange was
"an extraordinary piece of litigation."133 It then noted the nationwide
interest in the case, and that the plaintiffs, Vietnam War veterans,
were seeking "'emotional compensation"' for their sufferings, as well
as compensatory damages."3
Looking at the legal standards to be employed, however, the
court expressed great skepticism over the use of class actions in mass
tort cases generally.1 35 It discussed the 1966 Advisory Committee's
note but decided that certification was warranted because of the
"centrality of the military contractor defense. 136 It is important to
note, however, that the court did much more than invoke the 1966
Advisory Committee's note to support its skepticism. Rather, it
looked beneath the claim that global causation is a sufficient and
predominant issue to support certification. In that respect, the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion, despite its skepticism, shows how far the tide
has turned. Invoking the mantra of the 1966 Advisory Committee's
note no longer would suffice to defeat class certification. Instead,
careful analysis of the requirements of Rule 23 must be undertaken.
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common issues predominate over
individual issues.' Global or generic causation is an appealing basis
for invoking class treatment on the theory that such an issue pre-
dominates, and is, in fact, a threshold issue in any individual case.
However, closer analysis of most mass tort cases, like Agent Orange,
reveals that the issue might not be as generic as one would hope. As
the Second Circuit put it, a trial on the question of whether Agent
Orange generically causes injury could result in one of three out-
comes: (1) exposure to Agent Orange always causes injury; (2) expo-
sure never causes injury; or (3) exposure may or may not cause injury
1987). The court did not address the propriety of the limited fund mandatory
class on the issue of punitive damages because the settlement it ultimately ap-
proved precluded punitive damages. See id. at 167.
132. See id at 163-67.
133. Id. at 148.
134. Id. (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740,
747 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
135. See id. at 151, 164-66.
136. Id. at 151, 166.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
[Vol. 31:79
MASS TORT CLAIMS RESOLUTION
depending on the kind or amount of exposure, or other factors par-
ticular to the person claiming injury.
138
Experience with mass tort cases shows that there are very few
products that cause the kind of "signature injuries" which justify the
first outcome. For example, mesothelioma is a signature injury that
can be caused only by exposure to asbestos.1 39 Nonetheless, even in
the asbestos cases, most of the injuries claimed are not signature in-
juries.'O The second outcome, that a product does not cause injury,
may justify a class on that issue. The defendants in the breast implant
case could pursue such a theory in the cases involving claims for
damages due to autoimmune diseases because all epidemiological
studies to date indicate little to no likelihood that silicone causes
breast cancer. 1' Even in the breast implant cases, however, defendants
138. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 164-65.
139. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 633 (3d Cir. 1996).
The causal link between exposure to asbestos and mesothelioma has
been demonstrated to such a high degree of probability, while at the
same time few if any other possible causes have-been identified, that if A
is diagnosed as having mesothelioma and A was exposed to asbestos, A's
exposure to asbestos is recognized to be the cause of A's mesothelioma.
In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Research "shows that certain cancers do 'wear labels' in the form of DNA
adducts and mutational spectra." REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 205 (1994); see also Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 1219 (1987).
Proof that a toxic substance is harmful often involves evidence on the
frontiers of science. In many cases, the most that can be said is that ex-
posure to a substance increased the risk that the plaintiff would contract
a disease. Epidemiological evidence often can indicate only the prob-
ability that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant.
Id. at 1220.
140. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. at 1042 (noting
the insufficient evidence that asbestos exposure caused colorectal cancer). "In
most instances, cancers and other diseases do not wear labels documenting their
causation." REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 205 (1994); see also
Farber, supra note 139.
141. In his opinion certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class in the MDL
breast implant litigation, Judge Pointer did not provide an analysis of the re-
quirements under Rule 23. If he had, the question of general or global causation
with respect to autoimmune diseases certainly would have satisfied the predomi-
nance requirement. See Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig), Master File No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (final approval of $4.225 billion set-
tlement after fairness hearing).
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are using other tools, such as summary judgment motions and science
trials, to seek exclusion of plaintiffs' evidence under Daubert.
42
The possibility of the third outcome, which is the most common
one in mass tort litigation, may not support class certification because
the question of generic causation and individual causation may be
hopelessly intertwined." Those applying a literalist approach to
Rule 23, as opposed to the policy-oriented approach used by Judge
Weinstein, could doom class certification in all but the most extraor-
dinary cases. As we will see, even a litigation as extraordinary as as-
bestos may not, in itself, support class certification.
2. Settlement transcendent
Explicit in Judge Weinstein's Agent Orange opinion was the no-
tion that certifying the class would facilitate settlement.' 44 The court
of appeals affirmed Judge Weinstein's Rule 23(b)(3) class.145 Later,
in the Dalkon Shield litigation, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit pushed the envelope further and affirmed a mandatory set-
tlement class in connection with the Dalkon Shield Chapter 11
142. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1397 (D. Or.
1996) (ruling plaintiffs' evidence on causal relationship to be inadmissible under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which re-
quires that evidence have both a reliable scientific foundation and relevance to
be admissible).
143. See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 205 (1994). Deter-
mining specific causation requires:
an assessment of the individual's exposure, including the amount, the
temporal relationship between the exposure and the disease, and expo-
sure to other disease-causing factors. This information is then compared
to research data on the relationship between exposure and disease. The
certainty of the expert's opinion depends on the strength of the research
data demonstrating a relationship between exposure and the disease at
the dose in question and the absence of other disease-causing factors.
ld. See generally Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The
Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 469 (1988) (discussing causation issues in tort claims based on toxic sub-
stance injuries). In toxic tort and product liability actions, the issue often arises
in the context of the proffered plaintiff expert witnesses' summary judgment
submission regarding the causal link between the plaintiff's claimed injuries and
his or her exposure to the allegedly defective product or toxic substances. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (requiring trial
judge to act as gatekeeper in determining whether proposed expert testimony is
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence).
144. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 723
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
145. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir,
1987).
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reorganization."4 Like the Second Circuit's decision in Agent Or-
ange, the Fourth Circuit's decision can also be predicated on ex-
traordinary circumstances. Of course, at least superficially, because
it was approved as an essential part of the overall settlement of the
Dalkon Shield Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, it had an obvious
"limited fund" aspect.47 More significantly, by 1989, when the case
was decided, the court could cite to academic commentary"4 as well
as the "[r]ecent court decisions [that] have also spoken approvingly
of the class certification of mass-tort actions for purposes of settle-
ment" to support its opinion.'
As discussed in Part III, the A.H. Robins plan of reorganization
was acceptable to all parties because it achieved global peace. Af-
firming the settlement class was essential to the confirmation and
consummation of the Plan. The Fourth Circuit stated in a related
A.H. Robins case, affirming the injunctions against litigation that
were also employed to achieve global peace:
We think the ancient but very much alive doctrine of mar-
shalling of assets is analogous here. A creditor has no right
to choose which of two funds will pay his claim. The bank-
ruptcy court has the power to order a creditor who has two
funds to satisfy his debt to resort to the fund that will not
defeat other creditors. Here, the carefully designed reor-
ganization of Robins, in conjunction with the settlement in
Breland, provided for satisfaction of the class B claimants.
However, some chose to opt out of the settlement in order
to pursue recovery for their injuries from Aetna or from
medical providers for malpractice. It is essential to the re-
organization that these opt out plaintiffs either resort to the
source of funds provided for them in the Plan and Breland
settlement or not be permitted to interfere with the reor-
ganization and thus with all the other creditors." °
146. See Robins II, supra note 10, 880 F.2d 709,752 (4th Cir. 1989).
147. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter
Robins 1]. The court noted:
The bankruptcy court has the power to order a creditor who has two
funds to satisfy his debt to resort to the fund that will not defeat other
creditors. Here, the carefully designed reorganization of Robins, in
conjunction with the settlement in Breland, provided for satisfaction of
the class B claimants.
Id. (citations omitted).
148. See Robins I1, supra note 10, 880 F.2d at 738.
149. Id.
150. Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d at 701-02 (citation omitted).
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Therefore, A.H. Robins represents the highest degree of practi-
cality. There was a need to facilitate a settlement in a complex case
involving a debtor in Chapter 11, multiple other tort defendants, and
hundreds of thousands of tort claimants. Again, notably absent from
the Fourth Circuit's opinion was reliance on the 1966 Advisory
Committee's note. Rather, the court criticized the note's admonition
as "unworkable" and "increasingly disregarded..... The court de-
tailed prior cases in which settlement classes had been upheld-only
one of which was a mass tort case-and argued that the prevailing
academic and judicial view was such that using class actions to facili-
tate settlements supported affirming the mandatory class before it."5 2
The Fourth Circuit's language is an ode to the use of class ac-
tions in mass tort cases:
In summary, we take it as the lessons to be gleaned
from the authorities already cited and discussed to be (a)
that the "trend" is once again to give Rule 23 a liberal
rather than a restrictive construction, adopting a standard of
flexibility in application which will in the particular case
"best serve the ends of justice for the affected parties and...
promote judicial efficiency"; (b) that the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note suggestion that suit for damages is "not appro-
priate" for class certification has proved unworkable and is
now increasingly disregarded; (c) that the theory that the
Rule should be constrained by establishing judicially, with-
out support in the Rule itself, limitations on its use such as
were stated in La Mar, Green and McDonnell Douglas have
been outdated by the increasing phenomenon of the mass
products tort action and by the growing body of recent class
action decisions and comments favoring class actions in the
mass tort context; (d) that, in order to promote the use of
the class device and to reduce the range of disputed issues,
courts should take full advantage of the provision in sub-
section (c)(4) permitting class treatment of separate issues
in the case and, if such separate issues predominate suffi-
ciently (i.e., is the central issue), to certify the entire contro-
versy as in Agent Orange; and (e) that it is "proper" in de-
termining certification to consider whether such certification
will foster settlement of the case with advantage to the parties
151. Robins I, supra note 10, 880 F.2d at 740.
152. See id at 738-40.
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and with great saving in judicial time and services; and (f)
that the mass tort action for damages may in a proper case
be appropriate for class action, either partially or in
whole.153
Another example of the new rhetoric was the language the court
quoted from the Third Circuit's asbestos property damage class
action:
Concentration of individual damage suits in one forum can
lead to formidable problems, but the realities of litigation
should not be overlooked in theoretical musings. Most tort
cases settle, and the preliminary maneuverings in litigation
today are designed as much, if not more, for settlement pur-
poses than for trial. Settlements of class actions often result
in savings for all concerned.'m
No court of appeals would have used such language ten years
earlier. Together with the cases discussed above, the use of class ac-
tions in general, and settlement classes in particular, became de
rigeur.
This authority was obviously of great importance to the district
court judges who continued to be confronted with new and old mass
torts, and who perhaps looked forward to someday not being preoc-
cupied with such a crushing judicial burden. Accordingly, a settle-
ment class was approved by Judge Sam Pointer in the breast implant
litigation when all the federal breast implant cases were transferred
to him.'55 A very controversial'56 settlement class was approved by the
district court in the asbestos multidistrict litigation.' In addition, a
153. Id at 740.
154. Id. at 739 (quoting In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1009 (3d
Cir. 1986)).
155. See Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *1
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (approving settlement in breast implant class action liti-
gation); see also discussion infra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
156. An amazing number of law review articles and law review symposia have
been devoted to the analysis of the settlement class in Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 157 F.RD. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). For example, a 425-page sympo-
sium in the Cornell Law Review was devoted largely to the ethical and other is-
sues the Georgine class action generated. See Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving
up Just Desserts, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 811, 811-1235 (1995). A Westlaw search of
the Law Journal library reveals that over 150 law review articles discuss, to some
degree, the Georgine settlement class.
157. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 336 (E.D. Pa.
1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
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class action in which tobacco plaintiffs asserted the then novel theory
of addiction was approved by the district court in Louisiana.158 The
class in the breast implant case technically fell apart, due in part to
the extraordinarily large number of claimants who indicated their
desire to be part of the settlement.159 This led the major defendant,
Dow Coming, to file for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11."6
Nonetheless, claims are being paid pursuant to a successor plan of
compensation offered by several manufacturers of silicone. 6' The to-
bacco and asbestos classes, however, were vacated by the courts of
appeals, and the Supreme Court has affirmed that result in the asbes-
tos case.' Low tide for mass tort class actions apparently had re-
turned.
C. Low Tide Returns
The court of appeals decisions of the mid-to-late 1980s signaled a
significant receptivity to class actions in mass tort cases. Although
the use of this device, particularly the settlement class, became more
frequent, its use remained highly controversial. In the mid-1990s the
tide turned again. In a series of cases, the courts of appeals in a vari-
ety of circuits vacated class certifications in a variety of mass tort con-
texts.63
158. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 560-61 (E.D. La.
1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
159. See Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers
of Connecticut (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 718 (1997).
160. See id.
161. In October 1995 Judge Pointer approved a substitute settlement plan
proposed by the remaining defendants that would pay $10,000 to $250,000 per
claim, depending upon a woman's medical condition. See Henry Weinstein, New
Terms Offered in Breast Implant Cases, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at D1. The
original settlement agreement offered payments of $105,000 to $1.4 million per
claim. That settlement collapsed after too many women applied for the $4.2 bil-
lion in projected benefits. More than a third of the over 100,000 women who
filed claims against silicone breast implant manufacturers have accepted these
reduced settlements. However, thousands of other claimants rejected the plan.
According to one article last year, many plaintiffs say they are receiving more in
individually negotiated settlements. See id.
1 162. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997); Cas-
tano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing and
remanding with instructions that the district court dismiss the complaint);
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 638 (3d Cir. 1996) (vacating as-
bestos settlement class).
163. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d 734 (reversing and remanding district court or-
der certifying nationwide cigarette litigation class action); Georgine, 83 F.3d 610
(remanding to the district court with directions to decertify the asbestos settle-
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1. Has the balance of bargaining power shifted too far?
Recall that Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation and
the Fourth Circuit in the Dalkon Shield litigation recognized the
practical value of class certification in promoting global settlements
of mass tort litigation." Unfortunately, perceived and real abuses
that have accompanied many class settlements in recent years have
resulted in yet another judicial shift. The first "abuse" identified in
the recent rash of cases is the old idea that once a class is certified,
plaintiffs have an unfair bargaining advantage.' 6 The best recent ex-
planation of this theory is Judge Posner's opinion in In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc.,'" concerning the HIV hemophiliac litigation.
Over 300 lawsuits, involving some 400 plaintiffs, were filed in state
and federal courts seeking to impose tort liability on the defendants
for the transmission of HIV to hemophiliacs in blood solids manufac-
tured by the defendants.67 The federal cases were transferred, pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, by the MDL Panel to the Northern District
of Illinois." One of these cases became the subject of the class ac-
tion.
As in the tobacco case in Louisiana, plaintiffs advanced a novel
theory of tort liability. They claimed:
before anyone had heard of AIDS or HIV, it was known
that Hepatitis B, [often] a lethal disease.., could be trans-
mitted either through blood transfusions or through injec-
tion of blood solids. The plaintiffs argue[d] that due care
with respect to the risk of infection with Hepatitis B required
ment class); In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996)
(granting petitions for writ of mandamus and directing district court judge to de-
certify the plaintiff class in penile implant litigation); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995)
(directing district court judge to decertify class action in hemophiliaclHIV con-
tamination litigation).
164. See supra Parts II.B.l.b, II.B.2.
165. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Lumbard, J. dissenting) ("The appropriate action for this Court is to affirm the
district court and put an end to this Frankenstein monster posing as a class ac-
tion."), rev'd, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Judge Friendly called settlements induced by
a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action "blackmail settle-
ments." HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICrIoN: A GENERAL VIEW 120
(1973). But see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:
Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664, 679-82
(1978-79) (arguing that serious abuses died out by the mid-1970s).
166. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
167. See id. at 1296.
168. See id.
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the defendants to take measures to purge that virus from
their blood solids.169
Such measures would have protected hemophiliacs "not only against
Hepatitis B but also . . . as the plaintiffs put it 'serendipitously,'
against HIV.' 7
It was not feasible to certify a class action for all aspects of the
case, largely because the differences in the dates of infection alone
raised predominance problems."' Nevertheless, the district court
found that particular issues, such as this novel theory, could be adju-
dicated through special verdicts on a class-wide basis under Rule 23(c)(4)(A). 17
Defendants sought review of the district court's interlocutory
order by writ of mandamus." The Seventh Circuit's two-to-one
panel opinion began with a discussion about the standard for granting
mandamus but illuminated the court's thinking about the propriety of
class actions in mass tort cases. 4 Although it commended the district
judge for his experiment with an innovative procedure for streamlin-
ing the adjudication, Judge Posner, writing for the majority, found
that the "plan so far exceeds the permissible bounds of discretion in
the management of federal litigation as to compel us to intervene and
order decertification."' Immediate review was warranted, according
to the majority, because final review would come too late to provide
effective relief for the defendants. 6
The reason that an appeal will come too late to provide ef-
fective relief for these defendants is the sheer magnitude of
the risk to which the class action, in contrast to the individ-
ual actions pending or likely, exposes them. Consider the
situation that would obtain if the class had not been certi-
fied. The defendants would be facing 300 suits. More might
be filed, but probably only a few more, because the statutes
of limitations in the various states are rapidly expiring for
potential plaintiffs ....
Three hundred is not a trivial number of lawsuits. The
potential damages in each one are great. But the defendants
169. Id.
170. 1d.
171. Id. at 1296-97.
172. See id. at 1297.
173. See id. at 1294-95.
174. See id. at 1294-98.
175. Id. at 1297.
176. See id
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have won twelve of the first thirteen, and, if this is a repre-
sentative sample, they are likely to win most of the remain-
ing ones as well. Perhaps in the end, if class-action treat-
ment is denied (it has been denied in all the other
hemophiliac HIV suits in which class certification has been
sought), they will be compelled to pay damages in only 25
cases, involving a potential liability of perhaps no more than
$125 million altogether. These are guesses, of course, but
they are at once conservative and usable for the limited
purpose of comparing the situation that will face the defen-
dants if the class certification stands. All of a sudden they
will face thousands of plaintiffs. Many may already be
barred by the statute of limitations, as we have suggested,
though its further running was tolled by the filing of
Wadleigh as a class action.1"
Suppose that 5,000 of the potential class members are
not yet barred by the statute of limitations. And suppose
the named plaintiffs in Wadleigh win the class portion of
this case to the extent of establishing the defendants' liabil-
ity under either of the two negligence theories. It is true
that this would only be prima facie liability, that the defen-
dants would have various defenses. But they could not be
confident that the defenses would prevail. They might,
therefore, easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability
(conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They may not
wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will
be under intense pressure to settle .... Judicial concern
about them is legitimate, not "sociological," as it was deri-
sively termed in In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation."8
Ironically, the defendants settled the hemophiliac HIV litigation
for $640 million, a rather staggering sum if Judge Posner is correct
about the merits of the litigation and the number of suits the defen-
dant was likely to face. 9
177. Id. at 1297-98 (citations omitted).
178. Id at 1298-99 (citations omitted).
179. See Thomas M. Burton, Makers of Blood Products Agree to Offer $640
Million to Settle Cases Tied to AIDS, WALL ST. J., April 19, 1996, at B6. Assum-
ing Judge Posner was correct that only about 300 cases would confront defen-
dants, each case would be worth well over $200,000.
November 1997]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The Seventh Circuit also justified vacating the district court or-
der on the ground that the Erie" doctrine requires the federal courts
to apply the law that each of the transferor states would have applied.
Accordingly, class treatment would be unmanageable even on the
novel tort theory issue proposed to be treated as a class-wide issue by
the district court.
181
I have previously proposed a way for federal courts to deal with
choice of law problems in mass tort cases." My proposal would al-
low courts to apply federal common law in mass tort cases where the
MDL Panel has transferred cases for pretrial purposes. Given the
entrenchment of the Erie doctrine, however, it has never been
adopted."' Nor have various proposals to enact a federal courts
180. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d at 1300 (citing Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
181. See id. at 1302.
182. See Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on
the Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 167
(1985) [hereinafter Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases].
183. However, as Professor Mullenix explained, no other approaches have
gained sufficient favor with the courts or Congress. Rather, it appears that courts
will continue to have to work within the Erie framework. See Linda S. Mullenix,
Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1623, 1625-
26 (1992) ("And with some naivet6, perhaps, civil procedure professors have
been the vanguard academicians to recognize the complex choice-of-law issues
generated by mass-tort cases. Proceduralists, at least, early understood that
finding a solution to the choice-of-law dilemma was intricately related to finding
a plausible aggregate mass-tort procedure.") (citation omitted). Professor Mul-
lenix also stated:
Finally, Professor Lowenfeld's closing thoughts on choice of law in
mass-tort litigation pointedly suggest the ironclad hold that conflicts
scholarship has on original or otherwise unorthodox thinking with re-
gard to conflicts problems: "It may be thought to be an admission of de-
teat for a conflict-of-laws professor to tell a conflict of laws symposium
that the only way to solve the assigned problem is to adopt substantive
legislation."
The good news is that non-conflicts professors lack this instinct and
training and therefore are less likely to share this sense of defeat. Non-
conflicts scholars, then, are in a much better position to risk it all, and
renew the suggestion for a substantive law solution. Hear, hear. As
long as Congress and the ALI continue with their current legislative en-
deavors, these efforts ironically help to renew the desirability of enact-
ing substantive legislation. These efforts also suggest the parallel desir-
ability of relieving conflicts scholars of the task of recommending a
choice-of-law scheme for mass-tort litigation. And who knows, perhaps
some non-conflicts scholar will throw caution and reputation completely
to the wind, and renew the ridiculous suggestion for federal common
law.
Id. at 1662 (referring to Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases, supra note 182) (citation omit-
ted).
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choice of law statute been adopted.' Nonetheless, it is significant to
note that the choice of law consideration is relevant only if a disposi-
tive motion is made or if the case goes to trial. A primary purpose of
class certification, however, is to facilitate the aggregated resolution
of a mass tort through settlement. This is, of course, precisely why
Judge Weinstein wanted to certify the Agent Orange class." Thus,
the choice of law rationale should only be sufficient ground, if ever,
for denying class certification in non-settlement classes. The Su-
preme Court's limited approval of the use of settlement classes in
Amchem suggests that manageability problems stemming from the
Erie doctrine will not necessarily doom future class actions.
2. Understanding fairness
Judge Posner's opinion in Rhone-Poulenc squarely puts the le-
galized blackmail anti-class action bias on the table. But, where
Judge Posner seeks to protect corporate defendants from plaintiff
class action lawyers in cases where the plaintiffs appear to have an
uphill battle in proving liability, the Supreme Court's decision in the
multidistrict asbestos litigation purportedly seeks to protect plaintiff
class members from their class action lawyers and the defendants."'
As discussed above, until recently, the federal courts increasingly
used class actions as a means to settle mass tort cases. As the Fourth
Circuit put it, the trend in academic commentary and in judicial
opinions had turned in favor of the use of class actions as a vehicle
for settlement.' 87
As courts became more accustomed to certifying classes, some
commentators and courts began to question whether abuses and ethi-
cal lapses had permeated the use of the class action procedure to the
detriment of class members.'8 For example, the Third Circuit re-
versed a so-called "coupon settlement" in the General Motors side
saddle fuel tank litigation.'89 Judge Edward Becker, writing for the
184. See id. at 1635-47.
185. See supra Part II.B.l.b.
186. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), the Court
was concerned about the fairness to absent plaintiff class members. See id. at
2248.
187. See Robins I1, supra note 10, 880 F.2d 709,739-40. (4th Cir. 1989).
188. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1343 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars]; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1995); John A. Siciliano, Mass Torts
and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 990 (1995).
189. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
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unanimous panel, found that the settlement did not meet the test of
fairness under Rule 23 because the plaintiff class members' individual
recoveries were intolerably low in the face of huge attorneys' fees for
the class lawyers.'9 Indeed, the court questioned whether settlement
classes were appropriate at all."' In the Seventh Circuit and the
Third Circuit, it was clear that mass tort class actions were no longer
friends; rather, they have become the enemies. Judge Becker re-
turned to this theme a year later in the MDL asbestos litigation,
again vacating a settlement class." The Supreme Court, by a 6-2
vote, recently affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment. 3
The Supreme Court, just as the Third Circuit did, quite clearly is
signaling its distaste for the possibly collusive conduct of counsel for
the opposing parties that may lead to the use of settlement classes in
mass tort cases. 94 At the same time, however, the Court rejected the
Third Circuit's opinion that settlement classes must meet the same
criteria for certification as if the case were to be tried."' Accordingly,
it is important to look carefully at how the class in the asbestos case
came about in order to understand what the Court's opinion means
for the future use of class actions in mass tort cases, particularly set-
tlement classes.
As discussed in Part II,96 thousands of asbestos cases were
pending throughout the federal district courts. Many of them were
pending in the Eastern District of Texas. The MDL Panel trans-
ferred most of the remaining asbestos cases to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania" where they were consolidated for pretrial purposes.
Attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants formed separate steering
55 F.3d 768, 819 (3d Cir. 1995), cert denied sub nom. 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
190. See id. at 803, 822.
191. See id. at 818.
192. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub
nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
193. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). Justice Ginsburg delivered the
opinion of the Court. See id. at 2237. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Stevens joined. See id. at 2252. Justice O'Connor took no part
in the case. See id. Justice Breyer's dissent was based on his view that the ex-
tensive fairness hearing conducted by the district court warranted a more defer-
ential degree of judicial review. This observation then led to his policy-based ra-
tionale that if ever there was a case that warranted, indeed compelled, class
settlement, the protracted asbestos litigation which has swamped state and fed-
eral courts for decades was it. See id. at 2253-54.
194. See id. at 2239, 2248-50.
195. See id. at 2235, 2248.
196. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
197. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422-24
(J.P.M.L. 1991).
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committees19 and began settlement negotiations."' Two well-known
and experienced lawyers, each of whom represented numerous cli-
ents with pending asbestos claims, co-chaired the Plaintiffs' Steering
Committee. The Counsel for the Center for Claims Resolution
(CCR), a consortium of twenty asbestos manufacturers who were de-
fendants in the actions, participated in the Defendants' Steering
Committee. Negotiations focused not only on the pending claims
that had been transferred and consolidated by the MDL Panel's
transfer order, but also on settling all future asbestos claims that
might be filed.m' Throughout the negotiations, CCR made clear that
it would resist settling the individual pending claims which had been
transferred by the MDL order-the so-called "inventory claims" of
the plaintiffs' attorneys who were co-chairing the Steering Commit-
tee-unless the settlement also provided protection from the filing of
future asbestos claims. The focus of the settlement talks was on
devising an administrative scheme for disposition of future asbestos
claims."
During these negotiations, plaintiffs' counsel purported to be
negotiating not only on behalf of their own "inventory" plaintiffs, but
also on behalf of the anticipated future claimants, although, for obvi-
ous reasons, those lawyers had no attorney-client relationship with
such unknown claimants.' CCR refused to settle the inventory cases
until the negotiations seemed likely to produce an agreement purporting
198. Complex litigation, such as mass tort cases, involve numerous parties on
the plaintiffs' side and often on the defendants' side as well. "Traditional proce-
dures in which all papers and documents are served on all attorneys, and each
attorney files motions, presents arguments, and conducts witness examinations,
may result in waste of time and money, in confusion and indirection, and in un-
necessary burden on the court." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION § 20.22
(3d ed. 1995). A solution to the problem is the judicial appointment of lead or
liaison counsel or steering committees composed of representative counsel for
the parties. The court appointing such counsel generally will apprise them of
their duties, and they are charged with insuring that all attorneys involved are
apprised of the proceedings. See id
199. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2238.
200. See id.
201. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 266 (E.D. Pa.
1994) ("The primary purpose of the settlement talks in the consolidated MDL
litigation was to craft a national settlement that would provide an alternative
resolution mechanism for asbestos claims," including claims that might be filed in
the future.).
202. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
203. See id.
204. See id.
November 19971
118 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
to bind future plaintiffs.25 Upon settling the inventory claims, CCR,
together with the plaintiffs' lawyers, returned to the district court
with a class action complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement order
and a joint motion for the conditional certification of a settlement
class.'
Notably, none of the claims transferred by the MDL Panel were
covered by the proposed settlement because none existed at the
time.' Rather, the class consisted of all those who may have asbes-
tos personal injury claims, whether their injuries had manifested
themselves or not, who had not filed a lawsuit before the submission
of the settlement to the court.m Although the matter is subject to
some debate as to degree, the Supreme Court makes clear that the
recoveries negotiated for the inventory claimants were more gener-
ous than those that the future claimants would receive.m Nonethe-
less, the district court, after extensive fairness hearings under Rule
23(e), approved the settlement as fair and not collusive."' The Third
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 2239-40.
209. See id. at 2241; id. at 2256 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
210. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 319-25, 337 (E.D.
Pa. 1994). The district court held an 18-day fairness hearing under Rule 23(e), at
which dozens of witnesses testified to the ethical dilemmas of the settlement and
its fairness to the class:
Counsel for the Settling Parties, several lawyers representing various
Objectors, and counsel for various Amic participated at the fairness
hearing. Under the direction of the Court, the Objectors closely coordi-
nated their activities throughout the fairness proceedings.
Because of the complexity of the issues involved, and to give all in-
terested parties a full and fair opportunity to present their views, the
fairness hearing was extensive and protracted, involving the testimony of
some twenty-nine witnesses (live or by deposition) during 18 heaing
days over a period of over five weeks. The Court heard testimony from
participants in the settlement negotiations, several representative plain-
tiffs, two high-ranking officers of the CCR, medicar experts, financial
experts, legal ethics experts, and representative asbestos plaintiffs' at-
torneys. Numerous exhibits were also submitted. The substance of the
testimony covered, among other things: the decades-long history of as-
bestos litigation in the United States; the details of the handling of as-
bestos litigation in the current tort system; the negotiation and operation
of the proposed settlement and various objections to certain of its pro-
visions; the competence and adequacy of Class Counsel; the medical
conditions caused by exposure to asbestos and the reasonableness of the
medical criteria set forth in the settlement; the ability of the CCR de-
fendants to meet their financial obligations under the Stipulation
through insurance proceeds or otherwise; and the negotiation and op-
eration of settlements reached between Class Counsel and the CCR de-
fendants to settle in the present tort system the inventory of pending
claims of clients represented by Class Counsel and their affiliated law
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Circuit vacated the class certification, and the Supreme Court af-
firmed.1
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the 1966
amendments to Rule 23, noting that Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes
were thought to be the "most adventuresome" of the innovations
adopted that year.2 2 Furthermore, harkening back to early class ac-
tion opinions in mass tort cases, the Court quotes from the famous
1966 Advisory Committee's note which warned that "ordinarily [class
actions are] not appropriate in such cases., 21 3 Rather than represent a
return to the time when courts routinely denied class actions in mass
tort cases by simply invoking the Advisory Committee's note, how-
ever, the Court reviewed with apparent approval the more recent
trend in favor of class certification generally, and settlement classes
in particular.
214
Nonetheless, the Court makes it clear that district courts must
scrutinize such classes carefully. Unlike the Third Circuit, however,
the Court makes it equally clear that settlement classes are appropri-
ate in some cases.215 Indeed, instead of looking at whether all the re-
quirements under Rule 23(a)-numerosity, commonality, typicality
and adequacy of representation-and Rule 23(b)(3)'s special re-
quirements of predominance of common questions and superiority,
are met as if the case would be tried, the district court is required to
consider the settlement in determining whether the class can be
firms.
In May, 1994, this Court received voluminous post-hearing sub-
missions from the Settling Parties, Objectors and Amici. On May 23,
1994, the Court heard day-long final oral arguments on the fairness of
and objections to the proposed settlement.
Id. at 260-61.
211. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2252.
212. Id. at 2245 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDus.
& COM. L. Rnv. 497,497 (1969)).
213. Id. at 2250 ("'[M]ass accident' cases are likely to present 'significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability .... affect-
ing the individuals in different ways.' And the Committee advised that such
cases are 'ordinarily not appropriate' for class treatment.").
214. See id. at 2247.
In the decades since the 1966 revision of Rule 23, class action
practice has become ever more "adventuresome" as a means of coping
With claims too numerous to secure their "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination" one by one. The development reflects concerns about
the efficient use of court resources and the conservation of funds to
compensate claimants who do not line up early in a litigation queue.
Among current applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the "settlement
only" class has become a stock device.
Id. (citations omitted).
215. See id. at 2247-48.
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certified.216 This approach opens the door for the use of settlement
classes in appropriate cases because a court could well find that the
possibility of reaching a fair settlement is the reason why a Rule
23(b)(3) class is a superior means for resolving the dispute. The
Court provides some guidance as to how the analysis needs to be
done:
Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certifi-
cation, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if
tried, would present intractable management problems, for
the proposal is that there be no trial. But other specifica-
tions of the rule-those designed to protect absentees by
blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions-
demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settle-
ment context. Such attention is of vital importance, for a
court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the oppor-
tunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class,
informed by the proceedings as they unfold.217
So, what was wrong with the asbestos class action? The Court
seemed troubled by three important factors. First, to meet the com-
monality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), it is not sufficient to rely
solely on the class members' claimed shared interest in the fairness of
the settlement or their desire for prompt and efficient compensa-
tion."8 This is probably the Court's way of telling district courts that
they must carefully analyze the substance of the plaintiffs' claims to
determine whether the commonality element is satisfied. Second, the
Court's reference to the "sprawling" nature of the class suggests its
uneasiness with a nationwide class of hundreds of thousands, if not
millions of claimants.2 9 Specifically, the Court agreed with the Third
Circuit that because the class members were exposed to asbestos at
different times, for different lengths of time, and under different cir-
cumstances, the predominance of common questions requirement of
Rule 23(b)(3) was not satisfied.tm Differences in state law exacer-
bated these disparities22z' Third, and perhaps most importantly, the
216. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(3); Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2247-48, 2251
n.20.
217. 117 S. Ct. at 2248 (citations omitted).
218. See id. at 2250.
219. Id. at 2250.
220. See id. at 2250.
221. See id.; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985)
(noting that constitutional limitations on choice of law apply in nationwide class
actions).
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Court, like the Third Circuit, expressed grave concern about the fair-
ness of the settlement itself because of what it viewed as the serious
conflicts of interest of the attorneys representing the class.2 Alloca-
tion decisions were made by the class lawyers and defendants, as be-
tween inventory plaintiffs and future plaintiffs, and as between ear-
lier future plaintiffs and later ones, without specific regard to the
needs of each group. Thus, the adequacy of representation element
of Rule 23(a)(4) went unsatisfied. The Court opined:
As the Third Circuit pointed out, named parties with
diverse medical conditions sought to act on behalf of a sin-
gle giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses.
In significant respects, the interests of those within the sin-
gle class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently
injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments.
That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plain-
tiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the
future.
The disparity between the currently injured and expos-
sure [sic]-only categories of plaintiffs, and the diversity
within each category are not made insignificant by the Dis-
trict Court's finding that petitioners' assets suffice to pay
claims under the settlement. Although this is not a "limited
fund" case certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the terms of
the settlement reflect essential allocation decisions designed
to confine compensation and to limit defendants' liability.
For example, as earlier described, the settlement includes
no adjustment for inflation; only a few claimants per year
can opt out at the back end; and loss-of-consortium claims
are extinguished with no compensation.
The settling parties, in sum, achieved a global com-
promise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate
representation for the diverse groups and individuals af-
fected. Although the named parties alleged a range of
complaints, each served generally as representative for the
whole, not for a separate constituency.'
222. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250-51.
223. Id. at 2251 (citations omitted). The Court has not decided a case certified
as a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1). In the context of mass tort cases, as
the Court suggests, a case might be certified under a "limited fund" theory. The
Court granted certiorari in the Ahearn case. In this case the Fifth Circuit certi-
fied a mandatory class in connection with the remaining pending and future
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D. Are Settlement Classes Dead?
Settlement classes clearly are not dead. The question, however,
is whether, as a practical matter, the serious adequacy of representa-
tion problems discussed by the Court can be addressed by the parties
in Amchem and in other mass tort cases. There is no question that
the economic realities, both in terms of the size of compensation
funds and attorneys' fees, are huge.224 Perhaps because so many dol-
lars are always at stake in a mass tort litigation, there will always be a
concern as to whether it is possible for lawyers to steer clear of all
conflicts. Additionally, given the reality of modern tort litigation,
where most product liability actions result in some lawyers handling
hundreds or thousands of claims, the potential for conflicts is ever
present.
Nonetheless, the Court seems to suggest that the use of Rule
23(c)(4)(B) subclasses, but with independent counsel for all named
representatives, could have ameliorated its concerns about adequacy
of representation.' In summary, the Amchem case keeps the door
ajar for the use of settlement classes. However, counsel must tread
lightly under the trestle. Practice as usual will not be tolerated. The
lower courts have been sent a message to very carefully scrutinize,
and not to rubber stamp, proposed class action settlements.
claims in the Texas asbestos litigation. See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th
Cir. 1996). However, the Court then vacated and remanded the case for recon-
sideration in light of its decision in Amchem. See Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct.
2503 (1997). On the one hand, from the Supreme Court's quote, it appears that
given the equitable nature of a mandatory class theory, it is appropriate for those
negotiating a settlement to make allocation decisions. On the other hand, it ap-
pears equally clear that the Court will not approve a mandatory class without the
type of adequate representation its decision in Amchem requires. See generally,
Linda S. Mullenix, Do Mandatory Monetary-Settlement Classes Violate Due
Process?, P~imvmw U.S. Sup. Cr. CAS., Dec. 23, 1996, at 221; Patricia Anne
Solomon, Are Mandatory Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 72 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 1627 (1997).
224. See Coffee, Jr., Class Wars, supra note 188, at 1347-51; Bruce L. Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 479, 479-80 (1997); Myron Levin, Battling Big Tobacco Earns
Lawyers Big Fees, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 1997, at A10; see generally Christopher
P. Lu, Procedural Solutions to the Attorney's Fee Problem in Complex Litigation,
26 U. RIcH. L. REv. 41 (1991) (discussing attorneys' fees problem and potential
remedial solutions in, among other cases, class action suits with resulting com-
mon funds).
225. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 619. See generally Lu, supra
note 224 (discussing attorneys' fees problem and potential remedial solutions in,
among other cases, class action suits with resulting common funds).
226. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250-51.
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We will now turn to a consideration of the genesis and the poli-
cies and performance of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust to dem-
onstrate that it is possible to achieve arms-length negotiated settle-
ment funds and claims resolution mechanisms that provide for fair
and adequate compensation to the victims of a mass tort.
III. FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY: THE DALKON SHIELD
CLAIMANTS TRUST'
The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, the key part of the A.H.
Robins Company's Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, was estab-
lished to resolve the claims of the thousands of women and men who
claimed injuries due to the use of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine de-
vice.' After resolution of all appeals of the Confirmation Order, the
Plan was consummated on December 15, 1989 (the "Consummation
Date"), at which time the Trust received the bulk of its funds: $2.33
billion.29 I have discussed elsewhere quite extensively the genesis
and history of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust.20 In the next sec-
tion, I will provide a summary of the relevant parts of that discussion,
227. Part III is based on the author's knowledge and experience as Chairper-
son of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. The statistics that do not footnote to
an outside source were calculated for the express purpose of this Article and are
on file with the author.
228. See Debtor's Sixth Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization, In re
A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure
Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988)
[hereinafter Plan]. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust was established as part of
the Plan of Reorganization of the A.H. Robins Company. See Sixth Amended
and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 28, 1988) (No. 85-01307-R) [hereinafter Disclosure
Statement], confirmed, In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd,
880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). The Claimants Trust Agreement authorized the
Trustees to establish a claims resolution process to resolve the claims of those
who timely notified the court that they intended to seek compensation. See
Claimants Trust Agreement § 2.02, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in
Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988) [hereinafter CTA].
229. See CTA, supra note 228, § 5.01; see also Agreement and Plan of Merger
Dated as of March 21, 1988, among A.H. Robins Company, American Home
Products Corporation and AHP Subsidiary (9) Corporation § 6.12(a), In re A.H.
Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure State-
ment Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988). Rob-
ins's Plan of Reorganization was confirmed on July 26, 1988. The Confirmation
Order established the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust and provided for an initial
funding in the amount of $100,000,000. See Robins III, supra note 52, 880 F.2d
769, 771 (4th Cir. 1989).
230. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15.
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and provide details of later-adopted policies and the Trust's perform-
ance. 3
A. The Bankruptcy Case Estimation and Plan of Reorganization
1. The estimation process
After the Supreme Court's decision, it is clear that no aggregated
solution will be considered fair unless it provides sufficient funding
for all claimants. Thus, an important aspect of the Robins bank-
ruptcy proceeding for posterity's sake is the question of adequate
funding. Accordingly, the A.H. Robins Chapter 11 estimation proc-
ess was of critical importance. Its purpose was to estimate the
amount of money that would be needed to satisfy all valid Dalkon
Shield claims.33 As the breast implant litigation makes clear, realisti-
cally estimating the number of claims is critical to insuring the success
of any attempt at setting up a claims resolution process.'
It is perhaps easier to accomplish this goal in the context of a re-
organization plan because all creditors-tort claimants and potential
tort claimants-must file proofs of claim or their tort claims may be
231. A brief history of the Dalkon Shield and the Chapter 11 case is set forth
in In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 711-22 (4th Cir. 1989). Other details re-
garding the A.H. Robins bankruptcy case are explained in In re A.H. Robins Co.,
88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988) [hereinafter Breland], affd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.
1989). See Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d 694, 696 n.1 (4th Cir. 1989) for a
list of the Fourth Circuit's series of Dalkon Shield cases. See also Tetuan v. A.H.
Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1218-24 (D. Kan. 1987) (affirming $1.75 million com-
pensatory and $7.5 million punitive jury award).
At least three books have focused on the various relationships of the key
players involved in the bankruptcy case. See RONALD C. BACIGAL, MAY IT
PLEASE THE COURT, A BIOGRAPHY OF JUDGE ROBERT R. MERHIGE, JR. (1992);
MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE
DALKON SHIELD (1985); SOBOL, supra note 40. The main players were: (1)
United States District Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., who retained jurisdiction
over the case and jointly decided matters with bankruptcy Judge Blackwell N.
Shelley; (2) the Claimants Committee, led by Murray Drabkin, at the time a
partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft; (3) the Robins family, who con-
trolled the company; (4) Aetna Insurance Company, Robins's insurance carrier,
which was being sued for fraud and RICO violations along with Robins after
plaintiffs' lawyers alleged that Robins and Aetna conspired to withhold informa-
tion about the problems with the Dalkon Shield; and (5) American Home Prod-
ucts, the company which eventually acquired Robins for more than $3 billion, the
bulk of which funded the Trust. See Robins II, supra note 10, 880 F.2d 709, 720
(4th Cir. 1989).
232. See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying footnotes.
233. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 627-28.
234. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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extinguished through the discharge of the debtor.2s However, even
in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the same kind of notice can be given
to potential claimants, the members of a properly defined class or
subclasses, of their right to opt out, and that their failure to do so
generally means they will be bound in the same manner as a bank-
ruptcy claimant."' In any event, the breast implant litigation teaches
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate the size of the fund
first, and then determine how many claimants will file claims or be a
part of the class. A $4.225 billion settlement fell apart because more
women opted to participate in the settlement at the amounts pro-
jected than the fund could possibly pay.3
Rule 23(d)(1) empowers the district court to "make appropriate
orders ... determining the course of the litigation." Perhaps if the
district court had ordered a process like that used in the Robins case
under Rule 23(d)(1), a more realistic settlement could have been
achieved. In the Robins case, a bar date established a period in which
all claims had to be filed3' As a result of a worldwide notification
campaign publicizing the Bar Date, approximately 300,000 American
and almost 35,000 foreign women and men filed claims. After receiv-
ing these claims, the court mailed a brief questionnaire to the claim-
ants to obtain preliminary information about the claim in order to
provide more details to the estimation experts for their use in de-
termining how much would be needed to fund the Trust. Over
100,000 claimants failed to return the questionnaire, and the court
disallowed most of those claims." This left the court with the task of
235. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529-30 n.10 (1984)
("[P]roof of claim must be presented to the Bankruptcy Court... or be lost."). I
do not mean to suggest that the problem posed by future claimants is non-
existent in the context of bankruptcy, but rather that it is ameliorated by the
ability to ferret out and bind anyone who has or may have a claim. See Barbara
J. Houser, Chapter 11 as a Mass Tort Solution, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
(forthcoming Jan. 1998).
236. It is axiomatic that a class action judgment binds all class members so
long as they were adequately represented. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-
43 (1940). In the case of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, assuming proper notice to
the class, class members who fail to exercise their right to opt out of the class ac-
tion are bound. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
Even if a class member has not received the notice, they will be bound. See
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,319 (1950).
237. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 486 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996); supra
note 159 and accompanying text.
238. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 627-28; see also SOBOL, supra
note 40, at 97.
239. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 628.
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approximating how much would be required to compensate the ap-
proximately 197,000 active, timely claims required.'l
To assist the parties and the court in determining how large a
compensation fund needed to be, the court-appointed experts devel-
oped and sent a detailed questionnaire to a scientific sample of
claimants.? ' The various parties used the data obtained to present to
the court their estimates of the funds necessary to pay all valid
claims.242 Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., the district court judge
handling the Robins matter, determined that in order to pay all valid
Dalkon Shield claims and the Trust's administrative expenses in full,
the Trust required $2.475 billion, payable over a reasonable period of
time.243 Although the disclosure statement made it clear that if the
money ran out, there would be no recourse against doctors, Aetna or
others, the creditors approved the Plan because they believed that
there would be sufficient money to pay all valid claims, including per-
sonal injury claims.M
Clearly, the estimation process worked well. By the end of the
summer of 1997, all claimants, except for fewer than 100 who are still
in the arbitration or trial processes, had been paid $2.76 billion. The
$2.76 billion includes about $1.55 billion in initial settlements or
awards, and over $1.1 billion in pro rata payments. The Trust has
also paid administrative and other expenses, including taxes, of al-
most $400 million. Thus, the Court's estimation of $2.4 billion paid
over time was conservatively correct. Initial payments plus expenses
will total just over $2 billion. Thus, a portion of the pro rata pay-
ments will be financed with the original fund. The Trust's lean ad-ministrative structure, however, caused expenses to be approximately
240. See id.
241. See id.; see also Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 1989).
242. The estimates ranged from Robins's low-end estimate of $800 million to
the Claimant Committee's high-end estimate of $7 billion. Aetna's expert esti-
mated that the Trust would need $2.2 billion. See Special Note to Women Who
Used the Dalkon Shield: How Your Dalkon Shield Claims Will Be Treated 3, In
re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Disclo-
sure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988)
[hereinafter Special Note to Women].
243. See id.
244. Some claimants appealed the Plan on the basis that there may not be
enough funding to pay all valid claims. See Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d at
697. The Fourth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See
id at 702. That fear proved to be unfounded. Rather than lack sufficient funding
the Trust has already paid an additional 85% of each award to all claimants
whose claims have been resolved and expects to pay another 15-18% at the time
the Trust closes. See discussion infra Part III.B.5.c.
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$250 million lower than the court's estimation. 5 In addition, the
Trust's investment policies generated approximately $850 million in
revenues.' Accordingly, because of the Trust's efficient administra-
tion and investment program, an additional $1.1 billion will be avail-
able to pay claimants. Thus, the claimants will receive large pro rata
payments, and are likely to receive a 100% dividend above their
compensatory awards.
2. Global peace
As seen in the asbestos, breast implant, other mass tort cases,
and now the tobacco matter, defendants particularly want global
peace as a consequence of settling a mass tort. Not only should all
tort claims be resolved in the vehicle for settlement, but ideally so
should all potential cross-claims. As the lawyers in the asbestos liti-
gation learned from the Supreme Court, achieving global peace may
come at the price of great controversy. The Dalkon Shield case was
no different. There were many parties to the bankruptcy litigation,
and many defendants, including treating physicians and Aetna, Rob-
ins's product liability insurer, were named in the pre-bankruptcy
Dalkon Shield cases.247 Each of the defendants wanted the Chapter
11 case to result in the channeling of all Dalkon Shield claims, both
pending and future, into the Trust.24'
Through a number of innovative devices, Judge Merhige man-
aged to achieve the desired global peace. First, to resolve claims
against Aetna, which allegedly conspired with Robins to deny or un-
dervalue the viability of claims, he certified a Rule 23(b)(1) settle-
ment class in what came to be known as the Breland case.249 The set-
tlement required Aetna to pay up to an additional $500 million to the
245. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364, 368, 375 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating
the Trustees "have done an excellent job of administration" and have
"minimized administrative expenses" and the Trust "had limited its operating
and administrative expenses and had diligently monitored the claims resolution
process"), cert denied sub nom. 117 S. Ct. 483 (1996).
246. See id. at 368, 375 (stating the Trustees have "engaged excellent financial
consultants, and [as of Spring of 1995] earned over $800,000,000 by investing the
Trust funds" and "the assets of the Trust were wisely invested").
247. These defendants included: the A.H. Robins Company; members of the
Robins family and other high officials of the Robins Company; Aetna, which was
accused of conspiring with Robins; and doctors and hospitals accused of medical
malpractice associated with the use of the Dalkon Shield.
248. See Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d at 701-02 (discussing interrelation-
ship of Breland class action with Robins's Chapter 11 reorganization).
249. See Breland, supra note 231, 88 B.R. 755 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd, 880 F.2d
694 (4th Cir. 1989).
November 1997]
128 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
compensation fund for Dalkon Shield claimants. These funds pro-
vided some insurance in case the Trust's corpus of $2.33 billion was
insufficient to pay all timely claims. In addition, the settlement pro-
vided that those claimants whose claims had been disallowed for fail-
ure to return the court's estimation questionnaire could participate in
the Breland settlement2 0
The Breland settlement thus killed at least two birds with one
stone. Because it was a mandatory class, Aetna was essentially dis-
charged along with Robins from any future liability for Dalkon
Shield claims.2' Second, the settlement fund provided a place for the
disallowed claimants to receive compensation. This benefited all
possible defendants because such claimants could participate in the
settlement fund, rather than seek to sue any or all of the defendants.
Obviously, American Home Products, the company that purchased
Robins and provided the bulk of the Trust's funding, had a major in-
terest in insuring that all Dalkon Shield claimants and others who
may have claims for contribution indemnification, had some place to
receive compensation so that such claimants would not be tempted to
sue it.
Perhaps equally controversial at the time, the Plan itself not only
discharged the debtor, A.H. Robins, but it also provided for perma-
nent injunctions which had the effect of releasing the Robins family,
company officials, American Home Products, and doctors or health
care providers who otherwise could have been sued for malpractice
for any Dalkon Shield claims.f2 Finally, to insure that anyone who
had current or potential claims for contribution or indemnification
against Robins had a place to seek compensation, the Other Claim-
ants Trust, which was funded with $50 million, was created by the
Plan to provide for those claims.23 Thus, any claims arising out of the
use, insertion, or removal of the Dalkon Shield could only be filed in
the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, the Other Claimants Trust, or the
Breland settlement class vehicle.' The Fourth Circuit specifically
250. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
251. See Robins 11, supra note 10, 880 F.2d 709, 749 (4th Cir. 1989).
252. See id. at 752.
253. See Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d at 700.
254. Not all plaintiffs' lawyers agreed that there would be sufficient funds to
pay all personal injury claimants and expressed concerned that there would be no
recourse against third parties such as doctors. As a result, these plaintiffs' law-
yers appealed both the injunction provisions against third parties and the Breland
class action settlement. However, none of the appeals were successful and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the fall of 1989. See Menard-Sanford v. A.H.
Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989). The Plan was consummated in December 1989
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upheld the Plan's global peace aspect when it affirmed the Confir-
mation Order, which provided for the permanent injunctions on liti-
gation against defendants other than Robins, and approved the use of
a class action in the related Aetna/Breland matter.25
3. The Claims Resolution Facility
The Plan provided for the establishment of a Claims Resolution
Facility ("CRF"), to be run by five court-appointed independent
Trustees, to resolve the Dalkon Shield personal injury claims.26 The
CRF provided the bare-bones guidelines for settling the claims. First,
it provided for several compensatory settlement options. The
amount of compensation provided for in each of the options was to
be geared to the type of proof of injury and Dalkon Shield use the
claimant could present.' Second, the CRF also provided a process
for the Trust to accept "late claims." As discussed earlier, in connec-
tion with the estimation process, the court established a Bar Date for
the acceptance of claims.28 Those claims became the "timely" claims.
The CRF authorized the Trust to accept the claims of persons who
had not filed as of the Bar Date, and to pay such claims, on a subor-
dinated basis, if funds were available after paying all timely claims.2
Third, no punitive damages were permitted under the Plan.' Finally,
the CRF provided that if after paying all timely and late claims funds
remained, such funds were to be disbursed on a pro rata basis, in lieu
of punitive damages.26'
B. The Trustees' Implementation of the CRF
Three factors strongly influenced the Trustees' decision-making.
First, they were sensitive to the fact that the claimants were women,
many of whom believed themselves to have been victimized by the
when American Home Products acquired A.H. Robins and remitted $2.33 billion
to the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. See Alan Cooper, Way is Cleared for
Robins Trust, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 3; David Savage, Court Clears Way
for Dalkon Shield Payouts, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1989, at Al. The balance of the
$2.457 billion necessary to pay valid Dalkon Shield would come from members of
the Robins family and from Aetna.
255. See Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d 694,702 (4th Cir. 1989).
256. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364,367-68 (4th Cir. 1996), cert denied
sub nor. 117 S. Ct. 483 (1996); Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d at 722;.
257. See Robins I, supra note 147, 880 F.2d at 699.
258. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
259. See Special Note to Women, supra note 242, at 4; infra Part III.B.5.b.
260. See Robins II, supra note 10, 880 F.2d 709,722 n.16 (4th Cir. 1989).
261. See Special Note to Women, supra note 242, at 4; infra Part III.B.5.c.
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lawyers and the legal process. 2 Second, fewer than 30% of the
claimants were represented by counsel. The claimant population il-
lustrated the need for carefully considered policies, procedures, and
claim forms in order to enable claimants from various socioeconomic
backgrounds to receive appropriate compensation with or without le-
gal assistance.
Third, the Trustees' study of pre-bankruptcy litigation demon-
strated that a claimant's recovery generally had less to do with the
merits of her claim than other factors, such as the geographic loca-
tion, the particular claims adjusters' settlement limits, and the attor-
ney. As a result, the system the Trustees developed made claimants
less dependent on external forces and put them in a better position to
handle their claims themselves if they so chose. In turn, this devel-
opment controversially reduced the role and importance of lawyers.2 "
1. Decision-making principles
Three principles motivated the Trustees' policy decisions: (1)
treat all claimants equally and fairly by focusing on the best interests
of claimants collectively, instead of on the best interests of a particu-
lar claimant or group of claimants ("fairness principle"); (2) keep
administrative expenses at a minimum to preserve the funds available
to claimants with valid claims ("efficiency principle"); and (3)
262. See Karen M. Hicks, Dalkon Shield IUD Survivors: A Case Study of
Contraceptive Tragedy and an Emerging Social Protest Movement, 1986-1989
(1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Ms. Hicks founded the Dalkon Shield In-
formation Network, perhaps the largest support group for unrepresented Dalkon
Shield claimants, through which she sought to participate in the bankruptcy
process. The dissertation provides a history of the group and its attempts to par-
ticipate fully in the bankruptcy process, and to become a political or social force
for change in the methods for handling mass tort litigation. See id.
The dissertation shows the numerous difficulties the Dalkon Shield In-
formation Network experienced. For instance, Ms. Hicks describes the necessity
for the group: there were few if any attempts, even by the creditors' committee
representing the interests of the Dalkon Shield Claimants, to keep the claimants
themselves apprised of the legal proceedings. See id. at 75-76, 97-98, 105. She
also discusses how, instead of supporting her efforts, various plaintiffs' lawyers
tried to co-opt her group. See id. at 150-61. Few women's groups provided assis-
tance or support. See id. at 96-97, 145-47.
Ms. Hicks also argues that the activities of many lawyers led to
"revictimization" of those injured by the Dalkon Shield. See id. at 168-69.
263. This reduced role for lawyers is especially evident during the claims
resolution part of the process. The Trustees designed the claims forms so that it
would be possible for unrepresented claimants (73% of the total claimant popu-
lation) to obtain fair settlements without the assistance of attorneys.
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encourage settlement and prompt payment of claims instead of arbi-
tration and litigation ("settlement principle").' The result of these
principles was that through the claims resolution process the Trust
had a fiduciary stance in relation to the claimants, and an adversarial
one if the claimant elected the traditional tort process that the Plan
preserved.*2
With respect to the first principle, fairness required the Trust to
treat every claimant alike. The Trust therefore adopted policies to
insure that every claimant's case was evaluated solely on the basis of
her evidence, without regard to who her lawyer was, what jurisdiction
she was from, or what type of witness she might make. Occasionally,
extraordinary circumstances would arise which required an exception
to this principle. For instance, the Trust would expedite the disposi-
tion of a claim for a claimant in a terminal medical condition.
Not all people are equally powerful in the real world. The ad-
versary model all too often results in unequal justice, with more com-
pensation for the powerful. In a mass tort litigation, this has the po-
tential to lead to systemic unfairness especially where there is a
limited fund from which to compensate all claimants. Every extra
dollar a more powerful claimant extracts from the Trust is a dollar
less for the less powerful claimant. Generally, a represented claimant
will be more powerful in an adversarial process than an unrepre-
sented one. Failing to equalize the power relationships thus would
injure or be unfair to the nearly 75%266 of the claimants who were un-
represented. By refusing to play the adversary game during the ad-
ministrative claims resolution process, the Trust made it possible for
the claimants to compete against each other solely on the strengths of
their claims, rather than on the strength of their legal representation.
For example, the Trust designed its claim forms and informa-
tional materials so that all claimants would be able to handle their
claims without lawyers. The claim forms and instructions were tested
on unrepresented claimants from a broad spectrum of socioeconomic
levels. The testing led to the claim forms being revised many times.
264. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 637-38; see also WEINSTEIN,
supra note 16, at 280 n.88.
265. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 280 n.86; Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra
note 15, at 638.
266. At the time, virtually all the Trustees' major policy decisions were made,
approximately 134,000 claimants of the approximately 176,000 domestic claim-
ants (76%) who qualified for review were unrepresented, and 142,000 of the total
number of over 195,000 claimants who filed claims, domestic and foreign, were
unrepresented (73%).
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In addition, the Trust devised a program to help claimants prepare
their claims. Once a claimant submitted her claims materials, a re-
viewer examined her materials to ensure they were complete, and
assisted the claimant in obtaining missing documents from doctors
and other health care providers.
The Trustees' policies also were designed to maximize the bene-
fits accorded to the group of claimants as a whole. For example, the
Trust's "best and final offer/no negotiation" approach sought to re-
duce the upward settlement creep accompanying a negotiation re-
gime which might have resulted in claimants obtaining varying set-
tlement amounts that had less to do with the merits of their claims.
67
The Trust's approach avoided a system in which claimants, through
their attorneys, vied with each other for a settlement jackpot, to the
detriment of later claimants and unrepresented claimants. Instead,
the Trust developed a system that treated all claims fairly and equally
by equalizing the position of represented and unrepresented claim-
ants and that promoted settlements that would give the highest pos-
sible amount to each individual claimant. The amounts varied ac-
cording to the strength of the medical evidence, without depleting the
funds necessary to treat all remaining claims in the same manner.
With respect to the efficiency principle, the Trustees wanted to
treat the last claimant to whom an offer was made in the same man-
ner as they treated the first claimant. Thus, it was important to the
Trustees to operate the Trust as administratively leanly as possible.
The Trust was a model of efficient administration. The court had
projected that administrative expenses would amount to approxi-
mately 15%m of the trust corpus of over $2 billion. Actually, the
Trust expenses have amounted to approximately 6% of the fund,
which resulted in savings of over $250 million which would be dis-
tributed to the claimants as part of their pro rata distribution.69
267. See infra Part III.B.3.a.i.
268. Two of the party experts (for Robins and its product liability insurer) es-
timated administrative expenses at 10% during the estimation hearing. The ex-
pert for the claimants estimated a higher percentage. The courts' estimation
process was based on an estimate of 15%. This amount is closer to the overhead
costs of insurance companies. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the efficiency of
the Trust operation. See supra notes 245-46.
269. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 621. The Trust's success in
keeping administrative costs low stands in stark contrast to the experience of the
Johns-Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust which was set up as part of
Johns-Manville's Chapter 11 proceeding. At the time, that Trust was unprece-
dented. See Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville Per-
sonal Injury Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 27, 27 (1990). However, due to
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In addition, because it was not clear whether there would be suf-
ficient funds at the inception of the Trust, the Trustees adopted a
number of important policies to help insure that such funding would
be available. To achieve this end, the Trustees have made a number
of controversial decisions, such as the "best and final offer" ap-
proach, the "no negotiation" policy, and the "holdback," each of
which will be discussed below.
With respect to the settlement principle, the same controversial
policies also were designed to provide incentives to claimants to set-
tle through the claims resolution process rather than to litigate. For
example, the theory behind the best and final offer approach was to
make the claimant as high an offer as possible, given the Trust's lim-
ited fund and the claimant's evidence. If she knew the Trust would
not negotiate or "settle on the courthouse steps" because those in-
crements were already included in her offer, she would be reluctant
to test the offer and thereby subject herself to delay in payment, or,
possibly, an adverse verdict., Similarly, the Trust would fulfill the
goals of preferring settlement and prompt payment by paying the
claimant her full Option 3 offer once she accepted it.
2. Administrative payment options and claims evaluation
a. Option 1
The responses to the questionnaires submitted in connection
with the estimation hearing verified that many of the claims filed
would be frivolous or of relatively low value, either because of lack of
proof or the provable existence of only a minor injury. The purpose
flaws in the Plan and high administrative costs, the claims resolution system em-
ployed had to be drastically over-hauled. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 982
F.2d 721, 727 (2d Cir. 1992). Before the reorganization of the system however,
Manville's transactional and administrative costs were 25 times higher than those
of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15,
at 655-56. At that time, in 1992, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust cost per
claim was under $400 per claim, and the Manville Trust's cost per claim was
$4,900. See id. at 656 n.140 (discussing how this cost per claim was calculated).
For other comparative information, see id. at 655-56. Undoubtedly, the Manville
Trust's per claim cost has gone down and the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
costs per claim have risen. However, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust's costs
are still only about $700 per claim, and the rise is due in large part to the rising
legal costs. When the numbers above were reported, the Dalkon Shield Claim-
ants Trust had yet to pay the expenses of retaining defense counsel to represent
the Trust when a claimant rejected her offer and elected litigation or arbitration.
Since fewer than 150 claims will be resolved through litigation or arbitration, the
cost per claim over the life of the Trust will remain very low.
November 1997]
134 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
of Option 1 was to permit the quick disposition of such claims. As a
result, the Trustees adopted a simple procedure for electing Option 1
in the fall of 1988. A claimant needed only to file a form affidavit ac-
knowledging that she had used the Dalkon Shield and suffered a
Dalkon Shield associated injury.2m The Trustees offered Dalkon
Shield users $725 each, and offered nonusers such as husbands, whose
spouses claimed they used the Dalkon Shield, $300. By the December
1989 Consummation Date, the Trust had paid nearly 85,000 Option 1
claims, totaling almost $60 million?'"
The Trustees continued to offer Option 1 throughout the entire
claims resolution process. Another almost 50,000 claimants elected
Option 1. By the end of the Trust, over 132,000 Option 1 claimants
will have been paid a total of almost $90 million.'m
Most surprisingly, even claimants who initially elected Option 3,
then rejected their offers and proceeded to elect trial or arbitration,
in many casesm decided after analysis of their cases that it was in
their interest not to pursue the litigation, or even the Trust ADR
processYz4 but to receive some compensation under Option 1.
The success of Option 1 surprised not only those involved with
the estimation, but the Trustees and the Trust management as well.
The experts testifying at the estimation hearing predicted that only
28% of the claimants would elect Option L' Instead, over 60% of
the claimants eligible for consideration for payment elected Option 1.
The fact that so many claimants elected Option 1 made it possible for
the Trust to achieve lower transaction costs, and ultimately, was a
major factor enabling the Trust to make large pro rata payments.
270. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 633.
271. See id.
272. Not surprisingly, a large number of unrepresented claimants elected Op-
tion 1. In fact, 115,426 claimants were unrepresented, and 17,322 were repre-
sented. A total of about $77 million was paid to the unrepresented claimants,
and about $10 million to represented claimants.
273. At least forty-four claimants elected Option 1 after rejecting their settle-
ment offers.
274. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
275. In early 1989, before the Plan was finally consummated and the Trust re-
ceived the bulk of its funding, the Trust was concerned that some claimants had
unwisely chosen Option 1 and that they should have waited for the Option 2 and
3 claims process to begin. Accordingly, the Trustees ordered an Option 1 study
on this issue. The report showed that in fact, the Option 1 elections in all but
about 3% of the cases were the best choice for the claimants. Further analysis of
the other 3% showed that in most cases, there was a valid reason why the claim-
ant did not await Options 2 or 3.
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b. Option 2
The Dalkon Shield litigation, like other mass tort litigation, pre-
sented causation issues. In the Dalkon Shield case, the global causa-
tion issue was not too troublesome because medical experts agreed,
at the time,z2 6 on the types of injuries the Dalkon Shield could cause.
In fact, the CRF provided an exhibit which listed the various types of
recognized Dalkon Shield injuries for which the Trustees could
authorize payment27
The possibility of alternative causation, however, presented
problems for many claimants. Medical evidence indicated that most
of the injuries which were linked to the Dalkon Shield could have
been caused by something else, such as another manufacturer's IUD,
sexually transmissible diseases, or cancer2 8 The purpose of Option 2
was to provide payment to claimants with good medical proof of
Dalkon Shield use and good medical proof of a Dalkon Shield associ-
ated injury, but whose medical records revealed serious alternative
causation problems."
276. Ironically, subsequent medical research now indicates that the Dalkon
Shield may not have been the cause of some of the injuries alleged to the degree
thought in the early 1970s and through the 1980s. See P.M. Ditchick & J.M.
Ditchick, A Comparative Evaluation of Three IUDs, CONTRACEPTION DE-
LIVERY Sys., Apr. 1984, at 117-21 (1984); H.M. Hasson, Clinical Experience with
Intrauterine Devices in a Private Practice, ADVANCES IN CONTRACEPTION, Mar.
1985, at 51-61; Elton Kessel, Pelvic Inflammatory Disease with Intrauterine De-
vice Use: a Reassessment, FERTILITY & STERILITY, Jan. 1989, at 1-11; Richard A.
Kronmal, The Intrauterine Device and Pelvic Inflammatory Disease: The
Women's Health Study Reanalyzed, J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY, Nov. 2, 1991, at
109-22; Stephen D. Mumford and Elton Kessel, Was the Dalkon Shield a Safe
and Effective Intrauterine Device? The Conflict Between Case-Control and Clini-
cal Trial Study Findings, FERTILITY & STERILITY, May 15, 1992, at 1151-76; J.E.
Rioux, Pregnancy After IUD Use, ADVANCES IN CONTRACEPTION, June 1986, at
185-92; Herbert F. Sandmire & Robert A. Cavanaugh, Long-term Use of Intrau-
terine Contraceptive Devices in a Private Practice, AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY, May 15, 1985, at 169-75; R Snowden & B. Pearson, Pelvic Infec-
tion: A Comparison of the Dalkon Shield and Three Other Intrauterine Devices,
BRIT. MED. J., May 26, 1984, at 1570-73; Juhani Toivonen, Intrauterine Contra-
ceptive Device and Pelvic Inflammatory Disease, ANNALS OF MED., Apr. 1993, at
171-73.
277. See Dalkon Shield Trust Claims Resolution Facility CRF 8-9, In re A.H.
Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R), in Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure State-
ment Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code (Mar. 28, 1988)
[hereinafter CRF].
278. See sources cited supra note 276.
279. See SOBOL, supra note 40, at 313.
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Fewer than 18,000 claimants elected Option 2 .m The Trustees
expected that Option 2 would prove to be relatively unpopular for
two reasons. First, the payment scale was relatively low. Payments
ranged from $850 to $5500, depending on the severity of the injury.2'
The scale was low because this Option was designed for plaintiffs
with serious alternative causation problems who would have received
much less, if anything, in the traditional tort system. Second, the Plan
imposed rather stringent proof requirements. Specifically, a claimant
could not elect Option 2 unless she had medical proof of Dalkon
Shield use, which many claimants with alternative causation prob-
lems did not have.m
For an Option 2 type alternative to be more viable for resolving
more claims in future claims resolution facilities, the parameters
would have to be less stringent. For example, if the Trust could have
accepted non-medical proof of Dalkon Shield use, many claimants
with more serious injuries, but alternate causation problems, could
have chosen Option 2 instead of Option 3. Such claimants generally
receive a lower Option 3 offer than the scheduled Option 2 amount
for such injury claimed. This is because the Option 3 claims evalua-
tion rules generate low offers when the claimant's medical submis-
sion shows a significant alternative causation problem. Offering
higher payments under Option 2 may have attracted more claimants.
However, the Trustees believed that such amounts would be too high
given the presumed presence of alternative causation problems. If
too much of the Trust's funding were devoted to Option 2, the Trus-
tees feared that there would be insufficient funds to pay the most se-
riously injured claimants with the best proof the amounts they de-
served in Option 3.
c. Option 3
The purpose of Option 3 was to provide settlement offers based
on the pre-petition historical settlement amounts for claimants with
serious and provable Dalkon Shield injuries.' The CRF provided
280. Of those electing Option 2, 11,504 were unrepresented, and 6303 were
represented. A total of $56,582,861 has been paid to unrepresented claimants,
and $39,856,172 has been paid to represented claimants. These amounts include
pro rata payments that have been paid by the Trust.
281. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 636-37.
282. See id.; CRF, supra note 277, § D.
283. See CRF, supra note 277, § E.2. The Plan provides for the payment of
compensatory damages; punitive damages were prohibited under the Plan.
Amounts offered under Option 3 ranged from $125 (to claimants whose claims
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that claimants who rejected Option 3 offers could attend a settlement
conference.' Finally, if settlements could not be reached within cer-
tain timeframes, claimants could elect binding arbitration or trial.2
To facilitate the fair and equal treatment of all claims, the Trust de-
signed the claims review process to evaluate each and every Option 3
claim under the same highly structured, rules-based decision-making
process.2 For instance, in making Option 3 offers, the Trust did not
consider a claimant's geographical location or legal representation.
In addition, the rules were medically oriented, rather than legally ori-
ented. Thus, offers were unaffected by possible statute of limitations
problems, vagaries of state law, and the like.
In order to assure that the Option 3 payment system would both
reflect the values of the Trustees and be likely to generate acceptable
offers to claimants, the Trust put together an eclectic team to work
on the claims resolution procedures and payment systems. The
members of the team included the Executive Director of the Trust,
the Chairperson of the Trustees, the experts who had testified for
both A.H. Robins and the Claimants Committee, and a lawyer from
one of the most successful law firms to represent Dalkon Shield
claimants. The Trust also developed the Attorney Evaluation Project
in which experienced Dalkon Shield plaintiffs' lawyers evaluated
claims files and rendered opinions on their value, both before the
Robins bankruptcy, and in the Plan context with a limited fund. The
Attorney Evaluation Project helped the experts refine the claims
evaluation rules and increased the likelihood that the Trust's system
would result in proper evaluation of claims and acceptance of the
Trust's Option 3 offers.
Approximately 49,000 claimants initially elected Option 3. Pay-
ments ranged from $125 to over $2 million. Over 40,000 claimants ac-
cepted their offer without taking further action. Thus, the initial ac-
ceptance rate for Option 3 offers was about 83%. Another 1300
claimants, about 37% of the Option 3 claimants who attended a set-
tlement conference, accepted their offers after their settlement con-
ference.2 Although the Trustees were encouraged by the acceptance
rate, they remained concerned that the remaining Option 3 claimants,
which numbered over 7000, might elect their way into arbitration or
fail due to a lack of probative evidence of Dalkon Shield use or injury) to over $2
million.
284. See id.
285. See id. § E.4.-5.
286. See id. § E.2.
287. See infra Part III.B.3.b.i.
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litigation and inevitably greatly increase the transaction costs of the
Trust by generating the need to pay defense counsel.
Analysis of the rejections, however, showed that most rejec-
tions-approximately 67% were by claimants who received offers of
less than $6000.' Thus, the Trustees knew there would be a need to
develop a process other than arbitration or litigation to resolve these
claims. The Trustees believed that in most instances, there was a se-
rious problem with the claims valued at under $6000, generally be-
cause of the lack of proof on a provable serious injury or because of a
quite clear indication of alternative causation. Nonetheless, it was
apparent that these claimants believed that the Dalkon Shield caused
their injuries. Thus, the Trustees ultimately developed an ADR
process which would provide a vehicle for the claimants to quickly re-
solve such claims at a low administrative cost to the Trust. 9
3. Claims resolution policies and processes
a. policies
The Trustees made a number of policy decisions to accomplish
their goal of promoting settlement over litigation and arbitration.
i. best and final offer/no negotiation
The singular, most important decision of the Trustees was to
make Option 3 offers as high as possible considering the medical evi-
dence submitted, historical settlement values, and the existence of
the limited fund, rather than an initial low-ball offer. Accordingly,
the offers were necessarily the best and final offers, and not a point of
departure for negotiation.
Flowing from the best and final offer policy is the no negotiation
principle. Because the Trust's offers were designed to be fair and as
high as the evidence would support, the Trust did not negotiate at the
288. It was these claimants, the Trustees believed, who generally would have
been better off taking Option 2. The acceptance rate rose along with the amount
offered. In contrast to the 67% of the claimants who rejected their offers of un-
der $6000, 91.9% of claimants with offers between $20,000 and $100,000 accepted
their offers; and 98.1% of claimants who received an offer of over $100,000 ac-
cepted their offers. Similarly, the number of acceptances after settlement confer-
ences appeared to be a function of the size of the initial offer. Only 25% of
claimants with offers under $6000 accepted after their conference, while over
58% of those who received initial offers over $100,000 accepted them after the
settlement conference.
289. See infra Part III.B.3.b.iv.
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settlement conferences. Rather, these conferences were used to an-
swer questions and to explain the strengths and weaknesses of the
claims. Unless material newly discovered evidence was provided or
an error was made, the offer was not increased or decreased.
If a claimant rejected the Trust's Option 3 offer, the claimant
had to proceed to trial or arbitration. The Trust did not offer more
money to settle on the courthouse steps. The Trustees were deter-
mined to avoid the creeping settlements, which occurred in the
Manville case,29' which could have caused serious financial deficien-
cies to the Trust and which would have worked to the detriment of
claimants who had not yet been paid. The Trustees will not change
this policy because it would be fundamentally unfair to those claim-
ants who took the Trust at its word and accepted what they believed
was the highest amount the Trust would pay.
The Trustees' no negotiation policy was certainly a novelty for
trial lawyers, and it surprised many plaintiffs' lawyers and claimants.
At first, lawyers thought that the Trust would negotiate and they
tested the no negotiation policy. But after the Trust refused to settle
on the courthouse steps a number of times, attorneys realized that
the Trust was serious. At that point, the Option 3 acceptance rate in-
creased, resulting in fewer cases being filed and much lower attor-
neys' fees for the Trust to pay to defend such cases. This led to huge
administrative savings, which resulted in significant pro rata distribu-
tions. By the time the Trust finishes paying all claims, it is estimated
that an additional $1.5 billion will be paid to claimants in pro rata
payments.2"
ii. holdback
The holdback policy stemmed from the Trustees' initial belief
that there might not be sufficient funds to pay all timely claims.293
Recall that at the time the Plan was confirmed, some attorneys ap-
pealed the Plan because they believed the fund was inadequate." At
the initial expert meetings, there could be no assurances that there
would be sufficient funds; however, the Plan's terms contained a
provision to address the problem. The Plan permitted the Trustees
290. The Trust employed a FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) standard. See Vairo, Para-
digm Lost, supra note 15, at 644 n.93.
291. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 643,655-56.
292. Pro rata payments of over $1.1 billion have already been made.
293. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied
sub nom. 117 S. Ct. 483 (1996).
294. See supra note 244.
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to withhold some portion of the amounts awarded and to pay the bal-
ance when satisfied that sufficient funds would be available to pay all
valid claims-the so-called "holdback. 295 The Trustees implemented
the holdback by providing that claimants who settled their claims
would be paid in full, but that a holdback would be invoked when a
claimant rejected an offer and proceeded to obtain a judgment or
arbitration award.2 6
Thus, pursuant to the holdback, if a claimant was offered $X at
Option 3, rejected that offer, and obtained a judgment for $10X, the
claimant would only be paid $X or $10,000, whichever was greater.
The Trustees would pay the balance only when they were satisfied
that there would be sufficient funds to pay all claimants their Option
3 offers in order to fulfill their obligation under the Plan to "ensure
equality in distribution among claimants and the continued availabil-
ity of funds to pay all valid non-subordinated claims." 29
The holdback provision was consistent with the Trustee's goal of
promoting settlement over litigation and arbitration. By announcing
that any amounts awarded above the Trust's offer would be held
back, the Trust created a disincentive for claimants to "roll the dice"
in litigation rather than accept a settlement offer from the Trust.
The holdback policy was very controversial. The district court
approved the policy in Administrative Order Number 1, and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed. 8 In fact, however, lawyers seemed to have
perceived the holdback to be more powerful than it really was. The
policy was adopted in 1990, just as the Trust was gearing up to pay
claims. The Trust was not up to full speed, handling over 200 Option
3 claims per week, until July 1991. The settlement conference proc-
ess was also still in its incipient stages and would not be fully geared
up until 1992. At that point, the claimant still could be years away
from a trial. Given the backlog for settlement conferences in 1992,
even if a claimant elected arbitration, rather than litigation, it would
be years before most claimants would be in a position to get paid
more than the holdback allowed. In the end, the holdback was in-
voked in only seven cases.29
295. See CRF, supra note 277, § G.3.
296. See Amended Administrative Order Number 1, Governing Dalkon Shield
Arbitration and Litigation, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R) (July 1,
1991) at para. 13 [hereinafter Amended Administrative Order 1].
297. CRF, supra note 277, § G.3.
298. It took the Fourth Circuit over two years to rule on the issues. See In re
A.H. Robins Co., 42 F.3d 870 (4th Cir. 1994).
299. The total amount initially held back in these cases was $300,674. The
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Clearly, the best and final offer and no negotiation approach and
the holdback provision were designed to be, and were, strong incen-
tives for claimants to settle. Once ADR resolutions. are factored in,
the acceptance rate for Option 3 claims was a very high 99.4%. On
the other hand, these policies also ensured that once claimants re-
jected the Trust's Option 3 offers or ADR, litigation or arbitration
would inevitably follow.
b. post Option 3 processes
i. settlement conferences
The in-depth review and settlement conference stage was the fi-
nal administrative step of the claims resolution process for Option 3
claimants who rejected the Trust's settlement offersY3' As discussed
above, the settlement conference was not a negotiation session.
Rather, it provided the opportunity for Trust representatives to ex-
plain the weaknesses in the claim. While the rules for the initial re-
view of an Option 3 claim were construed liberally in favor of the
claimant, the in-depth review took a closer look at the claimant's
claim and additional submissions using the same evaluation rules
used in the initial review. Following this in-depth review, settlement
conferences were scheduled for the claimant to meet with Trust rep-
resentatives to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of her claim and
to determine whether any mistakes had been made in the evaluation
process. Unless a mistake in the evaluation of the claim was discov-
ered or the claimant presented newly discovered evidence, the Trust
did not increase its Option 3 offer.3
Given that the purpose of the conference was to discuss the rea-
sons for a claimant's offer, not to negotiate, the Trustees had no
holdback was first applied in December of 1992. All amounts held back were
paid in September 1994, when the Trustees determined that there would be suf-
ficient funds to pay the remaining Option 3 claims.
300. See infra Part III.B.3.b.iv.
301. See CRF, supra note 277, § E.4.-5.
302. Adapting case law that interprets Rule 60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to Trust procedures, "newly discovered evidence" is defined as
evidence in existence when the initial claim review occurred, but of which the
claimant was excusably ignorant. Therefore, the claimant must demonstrate that
she used due diligence when she attempted to obtain this evidence prior to the
initial review of her claim. This new evidence must be relevant and not merely
repetitive or cumulative of evidence previously submitted. Furthermore, to be
considered "newly discovered," such evidence must be likely to lead to a differ-
ent result when the claim is reviewed again.
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expectations that the conferences themselves would lead to many
settlements. In fact, almost 40% of claimants who attended their
conferences, either personally or through an attorney, accepted their
offers after the conference.
Participation in the settlement conference was voluntary.'
Originally, the Trust scheduled the conference, whether or not a
claimant intended to attend, because the conference date was critical
to the determination of when the claimant was eligible to commence
or recommence litigation or arbitration. The Trustees, however,
changed this policy in order to implement its ADR program. The
settlement conference process was time-consuming for Trust person-
nel and expensive. The ADR program was designed for claimants
who received relatively low offers. Thus, it seemed more cost effec-
tive to permit claimants who rejected their offers to either bypass the
settlement conference and elect ADR, or go through the settlement
process, if the claimant thought the claim was worth more than the
ADR limit.
The Trustees continued to believe that it was important to
schedule the settlement conferences unless the claimant elected
ADR because 37% of the claimants who attended them accepted
their offers instead of pursuing litigation. In any event, the confer-
ences put the claimant and her attorney on notice of the Trust's per-
ceptions about the defects of the claim.
ii. litigation
Because the Trustees were and remain determined to keep liti-
gation and defense costs to a minimum to preserve the assets avail-
able for compensation and large pro rata payments, they did not hire,
as is usual in mass tort litigation, a large law firm to serve as a
"national coordinating counsel." Rather, the Trustees believed that
the cost of litigation could be controlled most cost-effectively by cen-
tralizing its coordination out of the Trust's offices in Richmond, Vir-
ginia. The Trust's approach was successful both in keeping costs as
low as possible and in achieving favorable litigation and arbitration
results.
aa. internal organization and relationship with outside counsel
The Trust developed a skilled internal legal department to
minimize costs and maintain consistent defense positions on a national
303. See CRF, supra note 277, § E.4.
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level. Because consistency was crucial, in-house lawyers were re-
sponsible for directing the defense of Dalkon Shield cases in specific
regions and coordinating strategy among themselves and outside
counsel.
The Trust also needed experienced outside trial counsel. Early
on, the Trustees decided to use a regional counsel concept in which
five or six lawyers experienced in the defense of IUD cases would
serve as lead trial lawyers in all cases within their regions. This sys-
tem allowed the Trust to capitalize and expand upon the technical
knowledge of a few attorneys rather than having to educate local
counsel in each state on the complicated science involved in IUD
cases. The small number of regional counsel also enabled the Trust
to maintain consistent defense positions nationally. The Trust used
local counsel sparingly to avoid duplication of effort and expense.
The Trust's in-house lawyers were intimately involved and
closely scrutinized activity in each of their cases. There were fre-
quent planning meetings with regional counsel, where strategies for
handling specific cases, as well as global strategies, were discussed
and agreed upon.
The Trust developed in-house resources staffed by legal assis-
tants to control costs and insure consistency. The Trust prepared
draft discovery responses using a discovery database. All A.H.
Robins documents and testimony were kept in-house and research on
those materials was conducted by in-house staff. The Trust main-
tained a brief bank and based motions and responses to motions on
materials from that resource rather than having outside counsel
"reinvent the wheel" in each case. The Trust also coordinated the
use of expert witnesses in-house and maintained a database of infor-
mation on the witnesses.
bb. focusing on medical causation
The legal strategy that allowed the Trust to keep the Dalkon
Shield caseload at a manageable number, resolve cases quickly, and
avoid high damage awards focused on pushing cases forward to trial
and making medical causation the focus of each case. Unlike other
defendants, who may allow cases to sit without much activity for sig-
nificant periods of time because they know the case is likely to be
settled at some later date, the Trust, because of its no negotiation
policy, began planning the defense of each case with the expectation
that it would be tried. As soon as possible after a lawsuit was filed,
the Trust served written discovery, subpoenaed medical records, took
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depositions and asked courts for scheduling conferences. This early
discovery educated some plaintiffs' attorneys about the weaknesses
in their clients' medical causation cases and discouraged other attor-
neys, who would have liked a slow-moving process, from staying in
this fast litigation track.
In conjunction with the fast track toward trial, the Trust created
"bail outs" to let claimants out of the litigation or arbitration proc-
ess without negotiating claim values.
The key substantive defense strategy for the Trust was to make
scientific evidence on causation the focal point of each case. This was
an essential defense strategy because individual causation issues pre-
dominate and because the medical view of how or whether the
Dalkon Shield actually caused pelvic inflammatory disease changed
between the time of A.H. Robins's bankruptcy and the 1990s when
the Trust's cases were tried. In the mass tort context with a notori-
ous product, factfinders may have turned a deaf ear to medical testi-
mony about whether the Dalkon Shield actually caused a particular
plaintiff's injuries if most of the evidence they heard was focused not
on the medicine, but on irrelevant "bad company" evidence, such as
whether A.H. Robins acted properly in the marketing of the Dalkon
Shield.
Over time, the Trust employed a variety of methods to focus
each case on medical causation. In its first cases, the Trust was suc-
cessful in obtaining plaintiffs' counsels' consent to stipulate that the
only issues to be tried would be causation and damages. However,
after the Trust consistently prevailed or kept recoveries to a mini-
mum in these first trials, the plaintiffs' bar began rejecting the Trust's
offers to stipulate or demanding provisions that would have defeated
the whole purpose of a stipulation-for example, "The parties stipu-
late that the Dalkon Shield was a dangerously defective product."
Once attempts to obtain stipulations began to fail, the Trust
unilaterally began asking courts to narrow the issues to causation and
damages. Such methods as formal Motions to Narrow Issues, Waiv-
ers of Proof, and Amended Answers containing waivers, met with
greater success in achieving the Trust's objective of focusing on the
case-specific medicine rather than "bad company" allegations.
The Trust estimates that its defense system resulted in savings of
approximately 25% to 33% in legal expenses. Indeed, the Trust's
304. See infra Part mI.B.5.d.
305. See supra note 276 (discussing substantial revision of the medical com-
munity's findings on causation).
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legal expenses have been far lower than predicted. The greatest
savings, however, are a result of the high acceptance rate of the
Trust's Option 3 offers.' Original predictions for the number of
claims that would have to be tried ranged from 1500 to 10,000. In
fact, fewer than 1000 claimants, only 2% of those eligible to seek
compensation, initially elected arbitration or trial. All but 296 of
them, only 0.2% as of September 1997, subsequently accepted their
offers or one of the other Trust programs to resolve their claims.
For the claims that have been adjudicated, the results have been
very gratifying from the Trust's perspective, and vindicate the fair-
ness of its Option 3 offer process. The Trust prevailed, either
through summary judgment, failure to prosecute, or a defense verdict
in well over half of the cases that have proceeded. By the end of Sep-
tember, 51 cases had been finally resolved through litigation. In 21 of
the cases, the plaintiff prevailed; in 30 of the cases the Trust pre-
vailed. Another 37 arbitration cases have been concluded. There was
a decision for the 23 plaintiffs in 12 of the cases and a decision for the
Trust in 25 of the cases.
Of the cases in which the plaintiff prevailed, most jury verdicts
have been far less than the plaintiff requested, and generally have
been remarkably close to the litigant's Option 3 offer. Indeed, until a
series of relatively high plaintiffs' verdicts in the spring of 1997, the
aggregate amount, and the average award, recovered by plaintiffs in
arbitration and litigation was less than the aggregated amounts, and
average amounts, of their Option 3 offers. Even with these higher
verdicts accounted for, given the risk of a non-recovery and the
plaintiffs' demands, the amount gained in litigation was not dramati-
cally higher on average. For example, the average Option 3 offer to a
claimant who litigated was $28,311. The average award was $53,585,
while the average plaintiff's demand was over $600,000.
iii. arbitration
The Trust also developed arbitration procedures for claimants
who rejected their Option 3 offers. The advantage of arbitration was
that hearings were held much more quickly than were lawsuits filed
in state or federal court. However, only about 22% of those claim-
ants who elected to go beyond the claims resolution process elected
some form of arbitration.
306. Given the high costs of litigation, it is obvious that keeping cases out of
litigation resulted in substantial Trust savings.
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To accommodate both represented and unrepresented claimants
who rejected their Option 3 offers, the Trustees developed different
arbitration options. First, the Trust devised regular, quite formal ar-
bitration procedures that incorporated a discovery rule that the Trus-
tees believed to be more generous than that of most states.
Second, the Trustees developed "Fast-Track" arbitration. If a
claimant agreed to cap her recovery at $10,000, the Trust would
waive statute of limitations defenses, use an expedited procedure,
and waive virtually all formal discovery and evidentiary require-
ments. Moreover, if the claimant was unrepresented, the Trust would
be represented by a non-lawyer employee of the Trust.
The Trust expected this option to be most attractive to unrepre-
sented claimants, particularly those who had received low offers.
These claimants truly believed that their injuries were caused by the
Dalkon Shield, but could not prove it. This option gave them an op-
portunity to "tell their story," which the Trustees realized is an im-
portant ingredient of claimant satisfaction with the dispute resolution
process.
As mentioned above, for whatever reasons, claimants did not
choose either form of arbitration frequently. The refusal to invoke
arbitration is surprising, however, because lawyers actually fared
relatively better in arbitration than in litigation. Claimants, when
they prevailed, generally received considerably higher awards from
arbitrators than from juries or judges. The Trustees suspected that
claimants may fare better in arbitration because of the perception
that arbitrators are more likely to "split the baby" than jurors or
courts. However, the Trustees thought the concept of Fast-Track
arbitration was especially viable. Accordingly, it was reincarnated as
the Trust's very successful alternative dispute resolution program.
iv. ADR
After about one year's experience in making Option 3 offers, the
Trustees realized that the vast majority of claimants rejecting their
Option 3 offers had received offers under $6000.0 The Trustees be-
lieved that it would be appropriate to develop an alternative dispute
resolution process ("ADR") for these claimants, rather than require
them to go through the in-depth review and settlement conference
process before proceeding to arbitration or trial. While the latter
307. Sixty-seven percent of the unaccepted offers were by claimants who re-
ceived an offer under $6000. See supra note 288.
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process is lengthy and costly, both for the claimant and the Trust, the
ADR process is quick, simple and exacts very low transaction costs.3
The ADR option and rules are similar to the Fast-Track arbitra-
tion option outlined above. A claimant who agreed to cap her recov-
ery was not required to wait for an in-depth review and settlement
conference, but rather could immediately elect the expedited ADR
process before an impartial referee. When unrepresented claimants
elect ADR, the Trust is represented by a non-lawyer.
When the ADR program was first adopted, the cap was set at
$10,000. In the year the $10,000 cap was in place, almost 1000 claim-
ants elected the program. Because the program was proving to be
very successful at diverting claimants who rejected their offers from
litigation, once the Trustees realized that there would be sufficient
funds to pay all Option 3 offers, they raised the cap to $20,000, hop-
ing to make it an even more attractive option. After the new cap was
announced, the number of claimants electing the process shot up-
wards. In the first year and a half after the new cap was adopted,
over 2200 claimants elected ADR. In addition, within that first year,
the Trust permitted over 130 claimants who had previously elected
trial or arbitration to switch to ADR. Eventually, 715 claimants who
elected litigation or arbitration would switch to ADR. At the time
the cap was raised, claimants were receiving a multiple of about 4.1
times their Option 3 offer. In other words, the average Option 3 of-
fer of an ADR claimant was $961. The average ADR award was
$3947. There were more $0 awards (a total of 101) than $10,000
awards (68). Despite the authority to make larger awards, ADR
awards under the higher cap averaged less than 5.0 times the corre-
sponding Option 3 offers.
In sum, the ADR program was extremely successful.' Over
6600 claimants who rejected their Option 3 offer elected ADR. A to-
tal of over $41 million was paid through the program, at a cost per
claim of only about $1050. In comparison, the average cost of de-
fending each case in which a claimant elected litigation or arbitration
was $33,500. Of course, the cost of defending cases that were actually
tried was far higher than that.
308. The cost per claim for resolving an ADR case is $1050.
309. See, e.g., Frances E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation,
69 B.U. L. REv. 659, 687 (1989) ("[Dalkon Shield] claimants seemed to relish the
opportunity to tell their own stories.").
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4. Administrative Order Number 1
To avoid inconsistent and unfair results in the inevitable trials
and arbitration proceedings, the Trustees devised an administrative
order approved by the District Court .3 " The purpose of the Adminis-
trative Order was to govern various aspects of arbitration and litiga-
tion and to establish rules, in keeping with the Plan and the CRF, that
can be applied consistently and uniformly throughout every arbitra-
tion and litigation forum.
An important provision of the Administrative Order included
approval of the Trust's holdback provision to "assure the continued
availability of funds to pay all valid Dalkon Shield Personal Injury
Claims" from the limited fund.312 The Order also contained a number
of provisions controlling discovery in Dalkon Shield cases.' Because
the Trust initially feared an avalanche of claims, it was clear that
there was a need for the orderly initiation of suits against the Trust.
Accordingly, the Administrative Order also contained procedures for
insuring that a claimant not file an action without following all of the
steps of the claims resolution process.14 It also empowers the court
to stay any arbitration or litigation if the Trust can show undue
prejudice from the multiplicity of ongoing, pending or scheduled ar-
bitration hearings or trials.15 Finally, the district court retains various
powers regarding litigation and arbitration. 6 The Plan grants the
court continuing supervisory powers in connection with disputes
arising under the Plan.1 7
310. See Motion of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust for an Administrative
Order Governing All Arbitration and Litigation Proceedings Commenced, Re-
commenced or to be Commenced Pursuant to Section E of the Claims Resolu-
tion Facility, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R) (Mar. 6, 1991) [hereinafter
Motion]. The Order was approved by the district court and affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 42 F.3d 870, 872 (4th Cir. 1994).
311. See Motion, supra note 310, at paras. 8, 11.
312. See Amended Administrative Order Number 1, supra note 296, at para.
13.
313. See id. at paras. 4-6.
314. See id at paras. 1-2.
315. See id. at para. 11. Because the volume of cases initially feared never ma-
terialized, this power was never invoked. Rather, the Trust has aggressively pur-
sued trial dates.
316. See id. at paras. 3, 7.
317. See Plan, supra note 228, § 8.05; see also Robins III, supra note 52, 880
F.2d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding district court's supervisory power, except
in the case of day-to-day operations of the Trust).
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5. Winding up
a. final option election date
In the early days of its history, the Trust was working hard to
make all of its Option 3 offers and to schedule settlement confer-
ences. The claimants received claims packets in March of 1990 that
detailed the various payment options and provided guidance on
which option to elect.318 Claims came rushing in the day after the
packets were mailed. On the other hand, thousands of claimants did
not make a payment option election. Given the crunch of claims it
had received, however, the Trust was not concerned with pushing
claimants to make elections at that time. By 1991, however, the Trust
was able to estimate when its claims resolution department would be
fully operational and when the settlement conference process would
be put in place. The Trust then estimated its Option 3 resolution
rate, and began to plan for the ultimate termination of the Trust. At
that time, it was important for planning purposes to know which op-
tion all the claimants would elect.
In addition, the Plan required claimants to return their claim
forms within a year after the mailing, unless the Trustees excused the
delay. 9 Because the Trust had mailed virtually all option claim
packets to active timely claimants by June of 1990, the Trustees es-
tablished July 1, 1991, as the deadline by which these claimants had
to submit their claim forms to the Trust to avoid the disallowance of
their claims. However, as of May 1991, over 60,581 claimants had not
submitted a claim form. In order to avoid massive disallowances, the
Trustees gave claimants the option to file only an Option Election
Form, which simply required them to indicate which type of payment
option (Option 1, 2 or 3) they ultimately would file. Additionally, the
Trust mailed several warnings to unresponsive claimants to remind
them to file their elections, or be disallowed. Between the May 1,
1991, mailing and the deadline, the number of claimants facing disal-
lowance was reduced to under 18,000.
Similarly, after the Trust completed making all its Option 3 of-
fers in early 1995, it was important for planning purposes and to en-
sure the earliest possible termination of the Trust to require all
claimants to either accept their offers, or to elect ADR, litigation or
arbitration. The Trust set a deadline of October 1996 for this
318. See SOBOL, supra note 40, at 312.
319. See CRF, supra note 277, § B.
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purpose. Accordingly, by that date the Trust knew the highest pos-
sible number of cases it might have to defend and could make accu-
rate predictions about the duration of the Trust.
b. disposition of late claims
Under the Plan, the Trust was required to accept late claims.
Late claimants received subordinated treatment.m In other words,
late claimants could be paid by the Trust only after all timely filed
claims had been paid in full.
The Trust accepted late claims until June 1994. Over 74,000 late
claims were received by the Trust. The Trust turned its attention to
late claims shortly before it had made its last Option 3 offers to
timely claimants in early 1995. By that time, it became apparent that
the Trust would have sufficient funds to pay not only all timely
claims, but also all late claims. The Trust's more optimistic projec-
tions also suggested that funds would be available to make pro rata
distributions."m
The CRF sets forth a detailed administrative procedure pursuant
to which the Trust must review late claims to determine whether they
are entitled to treatment equivalent to timely filed claims." ' Of the
over 74,000 late claims filed, the Trust suspected that about 43,000
were fraudulent.3 Accordingly, the Trust successfully moved to
disallow those claims.3 4 The Trust then decided that it would be
administratively simpler and cheaper to use the CRF provision to
declare all the late claims to be timely. Thus, the claims could be
paid while the Trust's Option 3 claims review process was continuing.
Resolving the claims also meant that the pro rata could be paid
sooner because it could not be paid until all late claimants were paid.
Almost $150 million has been paid to the late claimants.
320. See id. § G.15.ii.d.
321. See infra Part III.B.5.c.
322. See CRF, supra note 277, § G.15. The Trustees originally tried to set a
deadline for late claims in December 1989. On March 30, 1990, however, the
court entered an order requiring the Trust to continue accepting late claims. See
Order, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R) (Mar. 30, 1990). With court ap-
proval, the Trust then set a deadline of June 1994 for the filing of late claims.
Pursuant to the court's order, the Trust sent a Late Claim Form to all persons
who contacted the Trust between December 15, 1989, and March 30, 1990, re-
garding the filing of late claims.
323. Indeed, most of the fraudulent claims were submitted purportedly on be-
half of citizens of the Philippines. Some of the claims were asserted on behalf of
girls under the age of ten.
324. See Order, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-01307-R) (Nov. 11, 1994).
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c. pro rata distribution
The Plan provided that if funds remained after the last timely
and late claims were paid, the remaining Trust corpus would be paid
to the claimants on a pro rata basis. Once it became clear to the
Trustees that even under a worst case scenario there would be re-
maining funds, they decided it was appropriate to begin making pro
rata distributions. Because the Trustees could demonstrate that
there would be sufficient funds, the Trust decided to make a 60% dis-
tribution in the fall of 1995. In fact, knowing an offer was in actuality
worth 60% more encouraged many claimants who had not yet ac-
cepted their offers to accept them, and encouraged many claimants in
litigation to accept their offers.
The accelerated rate of acceptances, together with the October
1996 elections, led the Trustees to announce a 25% pro rata distribu-
tion in November 1996. At the time, there were fewer than 200 cases
pending, and the Trust had more than enough money to satisfy any
conceivable awards that might be forthcoming.
A controversial aspect of the pro rata distribution was the Order
limiting attorneys' fees. Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. issued a sua
sponte order limiting the attorneys' fees payable out of any pro rata
distributions to 10%, rather than whatever contingency fee or other
contractual arrangements made between an attorney and client
would have provided.' Judge Merhige reasoned that the court had
received numerous complaints from claimants over the years regard-
ing the level of attorneys' fees, and found that no additional effort
would be required by claimants' counsel to receive the pro rata pay-
ments.3 Quoting Shakespeare's observation that lawyers "dream on
fees," the Fourth Circuit found that the lawyers' attempts to obtain
higher fees amounted to a "wonderful example of chutzpah," and af-
firmed.32
d. bailouts
As discussed in Part III.B.3.b.iv, the Trust adopted its ADR pro-
gram to provide an alternative to costly litigation and arbitration to
claimants who rejected their Option 3 offers. The program was re-
markably successful, with over 6600 claimants electing the program.
325. See CRF, supra note 277, § G.14.
326. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364, 367 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming dis-
trict court order), cert denied sub nonm 117 S. Ct. 483 (1996).
327. See id. at 370.
328. See id. at 367, 377.
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In addition, it was apparent in many of the almost 1000 individual
cases that were proceeding to trial or an arbitration hearing that the
claimant or the claimant's attorney would realize that going further
was not in their best interest.
As discussed earlier, the Trust would not negotiate the claims.
However, even where the Trust was quite confident it would prevail
at trial, the Trustees believed it would be pointless for the Trust to
spend the large amounts required to defend the case. Accordingly,
the Trust developed a number of "bailout" procedures to provide for
these situations.
The claimants had a number of options. First, they could elect
Option 1. Forty-four claimants elected this option.29 Second, the
claimant could elect ADR. Over seven hundred claimants of the
over 900 claimants who initially elected litigation or arbitration
switched to the Trust's ADR option. Third, the Trust also would
agree to reevaluate the claimant's claim. There was no guarantee
that the re-review would result in a higher offer. In fact, the claimant
was required to agree to accept whatever sum the Option 3 re-review
generated. The Option 3 reviewer would consider not only the origi-
nal materials provided in the claims review process, but also discov-
ery materials. In forty-six cases these materials resulted in higher of-
fers, but in sixty-three cases, the same offer was made. In two cases,
the offer was lowered.
Another process the Trust developed was its dividend offer. Be-
fore the Trust was confident enough about its finances to actually
make pro rata payments, but after it was confident it had enough
money to pay all claims and it appeared there would be payment of
pro rata claims in best case scenarios, the Trust knew it had enough
funding to permit the payment of a dividend. Accordingly, to induce
claimants to abandon litigation and arbitration, the Trust offered to
pay the claimant's Option 3 offer, plus a 75% dividend. In return, the
claimant was required to waive any rights to the pro rata distribution.
Claimants currently in arbitration or litigation remain eligible for the
dividend program.
Together, these programs resulted in large scale abandonment of
litigation and arbitration. Fewer than 200 cases remained in the liti-
gation or arbitration track By September of 1997, 51 litigation cases
and 37 arbitration cases had been concluded, and by the end of Sep-
tember 1997 there were fewer than 100 cases to resolve.
329. See discussion supra notes 273-86 and accompanying text.
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e. Administrative Order Number 2"0
To effectively complete its mission by the end of 1998, the Trus-
tees asked the district court to enter an order requiring all plaintiffs
who had elected trial to commence or conclude their trials by July 31,
1998. To enable claimants who were unable to get a timely trial date,
the requested order provided for such claimants to switch to arbitra-
tion. All arbitrations were to be completed by October 30, 1998. The
district court entered an Order setting these deadlines. Accordingly,
the claims of claimants who do not meet these deadlines will be disal-
lowed, unless they obtain relief from the district court for good cause
shown.
6. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: a summary appraisal
The following data suggests that the Trust's approach to resolv-
ing claims worked well. Since the Trust began resolving claims, it has
settled over 217,700 out of 218,500 Dalkon Shield claims and ap-
proximately 27,000 Breland claims eligible for review,33 at a total
administrative cost of about $700 per claim. The Trust will have ap-
proximately 75 cases to resolve by the end of 1997 and expects to re-
solve all remaining claims and is planning to terminate by the end of
1998.
When evaluating the Trust's performance, it appears that the
Trust was successful in leveling the playing field for unrepresented
claimants. Although unrepresented claimants have received ap-
proximately $483.1 million, over $1.1 billion has been paid to repre-
sented claimants through the various payment options, ADR, litiga-
tion or arbitration.
At first glance, the average payment to unrepresented claimants
may appear far less than that to represented claimants. In fact, that is
true because 157,117 unrepresented claimants have been paid, while
only 60,630 represented claimants have been paid. However, the av-
erage payment to unrepresented claimants must be evaluated in light
of the fact that a far higher number of unrepresented claimants had
330. See Adminstrative Order Number 2, In re A.H. Robins Co. (No. 85-
01307-R) (Oct. 31, 1997).
331. A total of approximately 350,000 timely and late claims were filed. Over
106,000 of these claims were disallowed by the court during the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, and approximately 50,000 claims were disallowed by the Trust. Claims
were disallowed for failure to comply with court or Trust deadlines for submit-
ting claims materials, or for fraud. An approximately 35,000 additional claims
were filed with the Breland Trust. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust handled
the resolution of those claims as well.
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de minimus injuries and chose the $725 Option I payment. When
payments under Option 3 are examined, unrepresented claimants are
actually netting higher average amounts than the average amounts
netted by represented claimants."' Based on 1995 data, unrepre-
sented claimants received an average of $33,150 before they received
their pro rata payments. Represented claimants received an average
of $39,047 before they received their pro rata payments. Assuming a
one-third contingency fee, represented claimants actually received
just over $26,000, about 21% or $7000 less than unrepresented claim-
ants.
Further, the Trust's compensation offers appear to be fair and
just, given that the initial acceptance rate on all Option 3 offers was
over 83%. Moreover, 37% of those claimants who initially rejected
the Trust's Option 3 offer changed their decision and accepted the
Trust's offer after the settlement conference, at which the Trust's of-
fer was explained. Most of the rest of the rejections (approximately
67%) were by claimants who received offers of less than $6000. The
Trust's ADR option proved to be very attractive for the vast majority
of these claimants. The Trust's ADR option provided claimants with
the opportunity to "tell their story" to a neutral third party. At the
same time, the Trust was able to conserve resources because damages
were limited by the cap, and because administrative costs for the
ADR program were only approximately $1000 per claim, in compari-
son to the six figure amounts for defense costs that trying a case or
formal arbitration hearings might entail.
Taking into account those claimants who rejected their Option 3
offer but who accepted the ADR option, the effective acceptance
rate was approximately 99.4%. Indeed, out of the over 350,000
claims filed, as of September 1997, fewer than 100 claims were re-
solved through arbitration or litigation, and there were fewer than
100 claims still in those processes. Because of the high acceptance
rate, and, by correlation, its very low administrative and legal costs,
the Trust has been able to make pro rata payments that amount to
85% of the initial payments to claimants, and expects to make an
additional 15% in pro rata payments.
Moreover, the processing of claims has moved efficiently,
332. See Direct Examination of Georgene Vairo, Chairperson, Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust, Apr. 27, 1995, In re A.H. Robins Co., 182 B.R. 128 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1995). Originally, the Trust did not disclose average settlement
amounts because it did not want claimants to decide whether to accept their Op-
tion 3 offer based on other claimants' experiences.
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allowing injured persons to be compensated without undue delay.
Between the fall of 1992 and spring of 1993, when the Trust was at its
highest resolution rate of making over 250 claims per week, it was
paying about $1 million in claims per day, and sometimes as much as
$10 million per week. In approximately four years, all Option 1, 2 and
3 offers were made, and in fewer than ten years, over 300,000 claims
were resolved.
To almost universal surprise, the Trust is likely to effectively
complete its mission by the end of 1998. Thus, the Trust was able to
resolve all claims within less than nine years after it mailed out all its
payment options to claimants in March of 1990, and approximately
nine years after the Plan was consummated and the Trust received
full funding in December of 1989. The Claimants Trust Agreement
itself suggested that it would take until the year 2008 for the Trust to
terminate.33 3 Accordingly, it appears that the Trust was able to com-
plete its mission in about the half the time contemplated. The Trust's
policies, which provided incentives to settle, rather than to litigate,
will result in the Trust going out of business well before the millen-
nium.334
The success of the Trust in resolving claims fairly and efficiently
has serious implications for resolving claims of women and other
traditionally less powerful persons, or for any victims of a mass tort.
Most claims were resolved through the Trust's administrative proc-
esses or through the Trust's ADR process. Since no two claims were
exactly alike, each Option 3 claim was given an individualized review
under the Trust's highly structured, rules-based claims processing sys-
tem for analyzing each claim. 35
As for individual autonomy, claimants who rejected their offers
333. The Claimants Trust Agreement provided for the Trust to terminate on
the date the Trustees certify that all claims have been paid and that the Trust's
mission has been fulfilled. See CTA, supra note 228, § 6.03(a)(i). However, the
Claimants Trust Agreement also provides for the Trust to terminate on Decem-
ber 31, 2008, and further provides for the Trustees to put into place procedures
for resolving any remaining claims and obtaining a court order approving such
procedures, but such order was limited by rule against perpetuities language. See
id. § 6.03(a)(ii)-(iii). Thus, it appears that the architects of the Plan believed that
the earliest date the Trust was likely to terminate was around the year 2008.
334. This fact tends to disprove the implication that the Trustees have an in-
centive to stay in business for the purpose of earning fees for as long as possible.
See SOBOL, supra note 40, at 323-24. The Trustees could have adopted policies
designed to prolong the process. Instead, they chose policies, such as the best
and final offer/no negotiation policy and the holdback, which were designed to
encourage early settlement.
335. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
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had several opportunities to tell their stories. First, they could pres-
ent their case at the settlement conference. Although the Trust
would not change its offer, the high acceptance rate after the confer-
ence seems to indicate the value claimants placed on the individual
treatment such a conference necessarily entails.
More traditionally, claimants had the right to ADR, arbitration
or a classic jury trial. Because of the Plan, claimants would not be
entitled to punitive damages.3" But in all other important respects,
the Plan preserved those traditional values.
Thus, the Trust experience shows that aggregated mass tort
resolution systems can be created-assuming a sufficient fund-
which preserve individual autonomy, and provide for the quick, effi-
cient and fair resolution of hundreds of thousands of claims.
IV. WHAT CONGRESS MAY WROUGHT
It is rarely a good idea to get Congress, or state legislatures, for
that matter, involved in torts. As I have argued elsewhere, tort law,
and specifically mass tort cases, are better handled by the judiciary as
a matter of common law.-" Returning now to the analysis in Part
II.C., the courts and commentators are largely concerned about three
things: (1) whether aggregation provides claimants with too much
bargaining power; (2) whether the due process rights of claimants can
be adequately protected; and, implicit in (2), (3) whether the settle-
ments that emerge from aggregation are fair. With respect to the
first question, the irony is that most commentators believe that
class counsel often "sell out" the class members by settling for an
amount that provides inadequate compensation. 38 In any event, I
336. However, the pro rata payment was distributed in lieu of punitive dam-
ages. Certainly, the equitable pro rata distribution is fairer than the windfall sys-
tem that characterizes punitive damage awards today. Moreover, substantial pro
rata payments have been made in lieu of punitive damages.
337. See Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases, supra note 182, at 219 n.349; see also GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-7, 31-32, 163-64
(1982) (discussing the problems arising from excessive law making by Congress);
A. Twerski & J. Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Products Liability Law, 28
DRAKE L. REv. 221, 222 (1978) (discussing the complications resulting from the
codification of products liability law).
338. See Hay, supra note 224, at 479. ("The risk that class counsel may in ef-
fect 'sell out' the class members in the settlement has long been a source of con-
cern among courts and commentators, and has become particularly pronounced
as the class action device has been used with increasing frequency in damages
actions."); see also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly,
J.) (discussing divergence of interests between attorneys and clients when there
are large amounts at stake); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir.
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showed in Part III that it is possible to answer all three questions in
the affirmative.
First, a proper estimation procedure can result in the creation of
a settlement fund that assures adequate compensation to claimants.
With respect to the second two questions, distribution mechanisms
can be created to provide fair settlements and fair procedures that
protect the due process rights of the claimants.
(Friendly, J.) (discussing divergence of interests between attorneys and clients
when there are large amounts at stake); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327,
347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (discussing the lack of adequate
representation of class action plaintiffs by their attorneys); Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars, supra note 188 (discussing the safeguards necessary to protect the interest
of claimants); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986) (examining the tensions
between attorney and client in class actions); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions:
Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD.
47, 57-59 (1975) (explaining the increased likelihood that attorneys will settle in
class actions); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement,
82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996) (discussing the involvement of courts in ensuring
adequacy of settlements); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991)
(examining the problems inherent in class representation); Nancy Morawetz,
Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5-7 (1993)
(explaining the safeguards recommended by commentators to protect the
interests of class members); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Susan P. Koniak, Rule of Law:
The Latest Class Action Scam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1995, at All (warning of an
alarming trend in class action litigation in which large, nationwide class actions
are being settled in distant state courts, often on terms that do not benefit class
members); Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons: Millions for Class-Action Lawyers,
Scrip for Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMEs, May 26, 1995, at Dl (reporting on settlements
"in which consumers are paid off in scrip while their lawyers walk away with
millions"); Richard B. Schmitt, Behind Apple's Class Action Settlement, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 4, 1996, at B1 (discussing case where judge tentatively approved a
class-action settlement in which the judge's brother, a partner in a law firm,
would share in the $2 million settlement fees); Richard B. Schmitt, The
Dealmakers: Some Firms Embrace the Widely Dreaded Class-Action Lawsuit,
WALL ST. J., July 18, 1996, at Al (discussing how companies use class actions to
their advantage because the terms favor companies and plaintiffs' lawyers but
provide questionable benefits to consumers).
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The proposed tobacco settlement,3 39 however, is just as flawed
from a due process perspective as the asbestos settlement class was.
Amazingly, the proposed settlement will deprive many persons
claiming injury from the use of tobacco products or exposure to such
products of their right to bring individual lawsuits, and class action
suits on behalf of such claimants would be entirely barred.31' Justice
Ginsburg likely would be just as offended, from an adequacy of
representation perspective, by state attorneys general seeking
reimbursement for state monies paid to sick citizens bargaining away
the right of the sick to sue for themselves or in classes, as she was of
plaintiff class lawyers seeking to settle their inventory claims
bargaining away the rights of future claimants.342 Even though the
tobacco companies have not paid a dime to a personal injury
claimant,34 3 without a provision for a claims resolution facility that
could handle the claimants' personal individual claims, the due
process rights of those who file claims last, or whose claims have not
matured into a legally cognizable injury, may well be left with no
recompense. In essence, the tobacco settlement presents the same
kind of future claimant problem and its attendant conflict of interest
problems as the asbestos settlement. To the extent that the adequacy
of representation prong of Rule 23 simply codifies the constitutional
rule of Hansberry v. Lee,3" Congress cannot do away with due
process rights any more than a court could in a class action.
339. See John M. Broder, Major Concessions: Industry Would Pay for the
Costs of Treating Smoking Diseases, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at Al; see also
Barnaby J. Feder, One Company Seen Settling Tobacco Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 1996, at D5 (discussing the Liggett & Myers proposed settlement).
340. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
341. See Broder, supra note 339, at Al ("The plan would end lawsuits filed by
40 states seeking repayment for Medicaid costs incurred by smokers, as well as
all class-action suits now in the courts and in the future. Individuals could sue
tobacco makers for past or future damages, but compensatory damages would be
capped at $5 billion a year."). President Clinton has objected to the settlement
on the grounds that it would not impose sufficient penalties on the tobacco
companies if teenage smoking fails to decline to target levels. However, the
President apparently will not object to the broad tort liability immunity that the
proposed settlement provides. See Aide to Clinton Sees Flexibility on Tobacco,
N.Y. TIMES, September 22, 1997, at A14.
342. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 52.
344. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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In any event, the Dalkon Shield litigation, the asbestos litigation,
and now the tobacco litigation all raise the kind of conflict of interest
considerations discussed by the Supreme Court in Amchem. The
Court tells us that inherent conflicts generally will preclude one
attorney or firm from properly representing hundreds, let alone
thousands, of clients with disparate injuries." When counseling
345. Articles on the Dalkon Shield case indicate that some lawyers are
representing thousands of Dalkon Shield claimants. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, How
2 Young Lawyers Got Rich by Settling IUD Liability Claims, WALL ST. J., Feb.
24, 1982, at Al (reporting on two plaintiffs' attorneys representing over 900
claimants); Malcolm Gladwell, Latest Fight In a Long Case: Attorney Fees,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1989, at Hi1 (reporting on an attorney representing 1000
Dalkon Shield claimants and still searching for more); Women Reject Settlement
Offers From Stingy Dalkon Shield Trust, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 14, 1991,
at D4 (reporting on attorney representing 1000 clients). With lawyers
representing such large numbers of claimants, obvious questions arise-notably,
whether these lawyers even have the time for individual communication or
consultation with their clients. See Jack B. Weinstein, A View From the
Judiciary, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 1957, 1961 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen
B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 269,
325. Huge fees are at stake in class actions. The contingent fee arrangement is
supposed to shift risks from the client to the attorney-the high risk of litigating
justifies a high fee. Commentators have criticized the use of high contingent fee
arrangements in claims resolution, as opposed to litigation, contexts because the
high risk does not exist. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is
There A Need For An Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1819,
1837 (1992) [hereinafter Brickman, Asbestos Litigation Crisis]; Lester Brickman,
Contingency Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 74 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, Contingency
Fees]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CI. L. REv.
877, 889-94 (1987).
Charging high contingent fees but not assuming any risk is arguably
unethical. See, e.g., Brickman, Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra, at 1837 (calling it
"illegal and unethical" as well as "grossly exorbitant" to collect contingent fees
under such circumstances); Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra, at 53 (charging
33% to 40% contingency fee is violative of "the fiduciary obligation to deal fairly
with the client" when risk of nonrecovery is low).
346. In the case of a properly screened Dalkon Shield claim, risk of
nonrecovery is minimal. Lawyers know exactly how much they can expect from
any single Option 1 or Option 2 claim simply by checking the Trust's damage
schedules. Although it is possible to recover from $125 to over $1 million in
Option 3, the medical evidence, and not the skill of the lawyer in "presenting" a
claim, is determinative. See supra Part III.B.2.c. Arguably, the lawyer's skill and
"risk" factors are relevant only if the claimant rejects the Option 3 offer and
elects trial or arbitration. One commentator, in describing the asbestos claim
resolution process, noted that it is "unfathomable... why lawyers continue to be
paid on a contingency basis since the processing of asbestos claims has become
relatively simple." See Lu, supra note 224, at 49. Although the medical issues
are not always simple, the claims resolution process in the Dalkon Shield is very
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client A, an attorney's judgment may be clouded by his or her fee
expectations in other cases 6 Contingent fees ranging from 24% to
50% for settling mass tort claims may be inappropriate if a claim is
settled without the need for negotiation or formal dispute resolution.
Courts should carefully supervise lawyers' conduct and fee structures
when lawyers are representing hundreds or thousands of non-
monolithic claimants.
Properly applied, however, the federal class action rule and
similar state provisions can protect the interests of class members
when hundreds or thousands of persons have similar claims by
requiring courts and the parties to provide for separate
representation of the various subgroups of injured claimants.'
Of course, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, which I have
argued successfully blended efficiency with fairness, was created as
part of a bankruptcy reorganization. In class actions cases, district
courts, however, have the power to issue orders under Rule 23(d)(1)
"determining the course of the proceedings," and, under Rule
23(d)(3) "imposing conditions on the representative parties and
intervenors." Thus, for example, the district court could appoint
experts to develop the data and order the parties to participate in an
estimation process similar to that used in the bankruptcy context. In
addition, the court-appointed experts could independently evaluate
the parties' submissions to insure the independence of each groups'
representations to the court349 Then, when the district court conducts
its fairness hearing under Rule 23(e), it will be in the position of
choosing among a group of submissions, rather than simply testing
straightforward. See supra Part III.B.
347. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for adequate
representation of class members to protect the due process interests of the class
and of the adversary. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
348. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1) & (3).
349. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (providing for the appointment of special masters).
[Vol. 31:79
MASS TORT CLAIMS RESOLUTION
one proposed settlement in what is essentially a vacuum.
As a practical matter, there appears to be a presumption that the
proposed settlement was fair. Thus, those objecting to the settlement
face a very heavy burden in showing that it is not fair. If the court
were to choose among competing proposals, even when the
defendant has only signed onto one proposal, courts would be less
likely to buy into the presumption that the proposed settlement, the
only one before it, is fair.
The Supreme Court's decision in Amchem commands a strong
judicial presence. While it is true that the approval of the Georgine
class action settlement appeared to be the product of careful scrutiny
because the court conducted an eighteen day fairness hearing, the
real problem is that the settlement proposal essentially competed
against itself. In other words, because it was the only proposal on the
table, there was a strong likelihood that the judge would approve it.'
If, on the other hand, the court were evaluating competing proposals,
it is more likely that the court would approve an amount that would
result in greater value to the claimants.
In Amchem, for example, the district court could have issued a
Rule 23(d)(1) order and appointed independent biostatisticians to
collect data about the claimant population to provide the basis for
determining what subclasses needed to be formed to insure adequate
representation. Such experts could look at the various injuries
alleged, exposure data, and settlement history to enable the parties to
more realistically determine the scope of the putative class and the
amounts that may be needed to compensate them. Then, had the
district court certified a group of subclasses, each group could have
proposed differing amounts from their perspectives. In addition,
especially in mass tort cases with relatively few subclasses, objecting
counsel ought to be taken seriously and be permitted to put on their
own extensive evidence as to the amount appropriate for a settlement
350. As many commentators have noted, a district court judge may have "little
ability or incentive to resist the settlements that the parties in class action
litigation reach." Coffee, Jr., Class Wars, supra note 188, at 1348 (citing THOMAS
E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL
DATA ON CLASS ACTION AcnIvrrY IN THE EASTERN DISTRICr OF
PENNSYLVANIA AND THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA IN CASES
CLOSED BETWEEN JULY 1, 1992 AND JUNE 30, 1994 at 57-58 (Apr. 1995)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review)), in which the
authors appeared to find that class action settlements were approved in almost
90% of the cases, and that the requested attorneys' fees were approved in over
80% of the cases. See id. at 1348 n.14.
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fund. Of course, the defendant is likely to agree to the lowest
amount proposed. However, in rejecting the amount agreed to by
the defendant, the court could inform the parties as to which
settlement it thought was fair. It is possible that the defendant would
refuse to settle at the higher amount. Yet, it is also likely that a
better settlement ultimately will be agreed to because to do otherwise
would substantially raise the "bet the company" risks.
In my view, strong, continuing judicial control over the class
action process is a key ingredient to achieving fairness. Of course,
many district court judges will want to dispose of the burden of
handling a mass tort litigation. There are, however, means to insure
that experienced and motivated judges adjudicate mass tort cases.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which is the vehicle pursuant to which cases
are consolidated in one district, the MDL Panel may choose not only
the district court, but also the district judge, to handle the
multidistrict litigation. The MDL Panel should choose a judge
experienced in handling mass torts, or similar complex litigation, who
has demonstrated a willingness in such cases to understand the issues
fully and do more than rubber stamp a proposed settlement. The real
issue is one of power and inclination to use the tools available
carefully. Each mass tort case presents its own set of problems, and
judges ought to be allowed to use the flexible Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to determine the best methods for handling them.5 '
There is an understandable unease about ad hoc, discretionary
use of judicial power to achieve aggregated solutions to mass tort
cases. 52 For example, Professor Coffee has written that judges have
done a poor job policing class action settlements and that their
authority needs to be constrained.353 Similarly, Professors Fiss and
Resnick have argued that informal, ad hoc processes should not
uniformly take the place of formal adjudication." However, as I
have argued before, once a case or series of cases becomes a mega-
case, or a mass tort case, dispute resolution should be about insuring
351. See Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases, supra note 182, at 203-08 (discussing use of
procedure in the context of a mass tort case).
352. See Coffee, Jr., Class Wars, supra note 188, at 1461-65 (discussing need to
constrain judicial authority in class actions). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1084 (1984) (discussing the importance of a judge's
obligations to conduct careful inquiries into the law and facts of a case); Judith
Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 432 (1982) (discussing need
to preserve formal adjudication).
353. See Coffee, Jr., Class Wars, supra note 188.
354. See Fiss, supra note 352; Resnick, supra note 352.
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open access to compensation, and about achieving fairness. 5 Indeed,
Professors Fiss, Resnick, and Coffee are all correct to note the
importance of the federal judge. I do not suggest informality; rather,
I propose a systematic means for allowing the district judge to
formally find the facts and law with respect to the need for separate
representation and the fairness of a class action settlement.
Moreover, given the reality of litigation, individual autonomy is
a myth. As many commentators have demonstrated, in tort cases,
rarely do clients confer with their lawyers."6 The problem in mass
tort cases is that the group of injured clients is not monolithic.
Proper representation of plaintiffs in mass tort cases will require
"radical alterations in our usual methods of protecting individual
client autonomy in the lawyer-client relationship."3,
There are a number of ways to balance individual autonomy and
the group and satisfy Justice Ginsburg's concerns about adequacy of
representation. There could be a steering committee of lawyers, each
responsible for a subclass. Perhaps one subclass should be comprised
of those who want to opt out. These subclasses ought to be
determined by the court after an expert analysis of the claims
identifies the different types of injuries and proof problems.
Techniques such as focus groups or claimant meetings could be used
to identify claimant wishes. 58
It may well be true that some claimants would be better off
without aggregated solutions. However, there is no due process right
to get more when that means some injured people will get less or
nothing. Equitable fairness considerations underlie the Bankruptcy
Code and Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class actions. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's decision in Amchem suggests that it is a due process
violation for those with some claims, for example, pending claims, to
receive better compensation than others, such as those with future
355. See Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure, supra note 3, at 1079.
356. See Deborah H. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and
Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92-97 (surveying studies showing that attorneys
usually do not maintain regular contact with their clients).
357. Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy
and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups,
78 VA. L. REv. 1103,1107 (1992).
358. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 345, at 325 (discussing
communication in the mass tort case and advocating the use of the federal
courthouse as central meeting site).
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claims. Thus, the Supreme Court in Amchem appears to have
rejected the notion that there is an inherent due process right to go it
alone and receive a maximum recovery that would be to the
detriment of others similarly situated.
Through the class action device, a notice campaign can be used
to identify all or most claimants, a settlement can be negotiated that
provides enough money for compensating the victims of a product,
expert panels can assist courts in ensuring the fairness of aggregated
settlements, and a claims resolution facility, managed by independent
trustees, can be created to provide various options for payments. A
balanced expert team, with a broad spectrum of ideas and
approaches, should work with an independent group of Trustees to
develop payment systems and procedures. There is a need for arms
length cooperation between the Trustees and plaintiffs' lawyers as
the structure of the Claims Resolution Facility is being established
and formally implemented. But the Trustees ought not be controlled
by any of the parties. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust routinely
received criticisms from lawyers, especially during its foundation
years, that it was not responsive to the suggestions of the plaintiffs'
bar."9 Yet, as I argued in my earlier article on the Trust, it was clear
to the Trustees that their fiduciary duty ran to the claimants as a
whole, and not to any subgroup through their lawyers."O
The challenge now is to develop a consensual plan in asbestos
litigation and in the context of the tobacco settlement that results in
the distribution of the most money to the victims in a way in which
the victims feel that justice has been served. Justice Ginsburg's
opinion in Amchem shows a particularized fear of the abuses that can
infect mass tort settlements. She has not closed her eyes to the
practicalities but requires that greater attention be paid to the needs
of the claimants.361 Allowing those with too great an economic
incentive to proceed without careful judicial scrutiny will compromise
important due process rights.362
V. CONCLUSION
We have seen the evolution of class action rhetoric over the last
359. See Vairo, Paradigm Lost, supra note 15, at 652-54.
360. See id. at 637-39, 652-54.
361. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231,2250 (1997).
362. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CH. L. REv.
877, 910-11 (1987).
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twenty-five years. At first, the theoretics of individual autonomy
prevailed, and courts rejected aggregated solutions to mass tort
litigation. Next, the rhetoric of efficiency propelled courts to
embrace aggregation as a means of facilitating settlements. Perhaps
this rhetoric invited abuse. Finally, the Supreme Court spoke
without embracing either point of view. Rather, the Court tells us
that settlements may be approved but only when claimants are
grouped to insure an appropriate degree of commonality and
adequate representation. The rhetoric of adequacy of representation
ought to be the last word.
Settlement classes are not dead. Rather, courts must carefully
scrutinize proposed settlements to insure that settlement funds are
sufficient and that the settlement proceeds are fairly distributed.
This can be accomplished by the use of proper estimation processes
and by providing for independent Trustees, under appropriate
judicial supervision, to determine the fairest and most efficient ways
of distributing the settlement fund thereby approved.
Even Professor John Coffee, perhaps one of the most passionate
critics of some of the class action settlements achieved to date,
understands the need for aggregated solutions in some cases. 63 He is
not sanguine, however, that courts are able to deal effectively with
the problems raised by mass torts and is opposed to giving district
courts even more discretion.3 ' I do not think the problem is the
degree of discretion. Rather, the problem remains whether a
settlement is fair. As the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust experience
shows, tools do exist to insure the creation of an adequate settlement
fund. As long as the court actually independently gauges the
appropriateness of the settlement amount, as Judge Merhige did in
Dalkon Shield and as could be done in the context of a class action
settlement fairness hearing, attorneys for plaintiffs will not be able to
collude with defendants to sell out the class.
In addition, rather than permit class counsel and the defendants
to make the essential decisions regarding allocation of the fund
among the various subgroups of claimants, to prevent conflicts of
interest from infecting the distribution, those decisions should be
made by independent Trustees, under continuing overall supervision
363. See Coffee, Jr., Class Wars, supra note 188, at 1348 ("Still, the possibility
of opportunistic behavior and collusive settlements is not, standing alone, a
sufficient basis for rejecting mass tort class actions. In truth, individual tort
litigation is notoriously expensive .....
364. See id at 1462-63.
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of the court approving the settlement. The court's involvement
should not result in interference with the day-to-day operations of
the Trust.3 65 Rather, the court should .be available to insure the
smooth overall workings of the settlement plan.
It is too late in the day for the rhetoric of individual autonomy in
mass tort cases. The rhetoric of efficiency and unusual circumstances
arguably invited abuse. It is time for the courts to fully embrace the
rhetoric of adequacy of representation so that mass tort claims can be
resolved efficiently and fairly.
365. See Robins III, supra note 52, 880 F.2d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1989).
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